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ABSTRACT

VITAL ALLIES:
THE COLONIAL MILITIA'S USE OF INDIANS
IN KING PHILIP'S WAR, 1675-1676
by
Shawn Eric Pirelli
University of New Hampshire, May, 2011

This study examines the role that Indians played in King Philip's War.
It argues that Indians a n d Indian fighting tactics saved the colonies from
destruction. This contention relies heavily on the assertion that February
1676 was the turning point in the war. Chapter I reexamines the role that
Indian spies a n d informants played in King Philip's War, a n d argues that
they saved the colonies from surprise attacks on major settlements.
Chapter II argues that "friendly" Indians played a significant role as
counterinsurgents against a c o m m o n enemy. Additionally, they provided
extra numbers at a time when the colonial militias suffered

from

impressment derelictions. Finally, Chapter III shows that only after the
colonial militia a d o p t e d Indian skulking tactics did they successfully repel
Philip's forces. In summation, this thesis argues that colonial authorities
organized English-Indian companies after a complete economic collapse
in February 1675/6. It was this Indian alliance that led them to victory.
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NOTES ON THE TEXT

Dates in the text are modified to incorporate both the Julian
calendar - which was used in the seventeenth century - a n d our modern
Gregorian calendar. Under the Julian calendar, 25 March began the new
year, rather than 1 January under the Gregorian calendar. "1675/6" will
follow any d a t e between 1 January a n d 25 March. This format preserves
the seventeenth-century style, while making it accessible to a twenty-firstcentury reader.
This thesis also keeps the original seventeenth-century spelling,
capitalization, a n d italics of words (unless otherwise noted). For instance, a
word such as "colors" might be spelled "colours." Likewise, the word
"near" might be spelled "neer." Many of these words are identifiable, a n d
the reader should have no difficulty deciphering the text.
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INTRODUCTION

In February 1675/6, a w o u n d e d Captain Benjamin Church arrived in
Plymouth to discuss the United Colonies' course of action. King Philip's war
had been raging through the New England colonies for nine months a n d
left in its wake unprecedented devastation. The combined forces of the
Wampanoags, Nipmucks a n d Narragansetts pressed closer to Boston a n d
Plymouth. The colonies feared that the Narragansetts would soon take
Rehoboth - a settlement thirty miles west of Plymouth proper. If they did,
authorities realized that their enemy would soon take Plymouth.
Captain Church addressed the council with great determination.
He boldly asserted that, given a c o m p a n y of 300 men comprised of onethird Indians, he would "lye in the Woods as the Enemy d i d " a n d repel the
Narragansett threat at Rehoboth. 1 This request probably floored the
Council who had recently offered Church 60 or 70 soldiers for a campaign
to Rehoboth. The idea that Plymouth colonial militia would a d o p t Indians
as soldiers was no doubt scoffed at by some of the members. After a brief
consideration, the Council of War replied "That they were already in debt,
and so big an Army would bring such charge upon them...And as for
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sending out Indians, they thought it no waves advisable." 2 Captain
Church was then dismissed.
One week later, Plymouth colony sent Captain Michael Peirse a n d
Lieutenant Samuel Fuller to Seekonk - several miles west of Rehoboth with "20 or 30 of the southern Indians." 3 The Council of War believed that
a campaign in the west would prevent the Narragansetts pushing forward
to take Rehoboth. With Peirse a n d Fuller was a W a m p a n o a g Indian
named Captain Amos who took c o m m a n d of a small portion of Peirse
a n d Fuller's company. In total the Peirse, Fuller a n d Amos' group consisted
of more than one hundred Indian a n d English soldiers.4
On 25 March 1676, Peirse's mixed English a n d Indian company
arrived at Seekonk. After a quick strike they w o u n d e d their enemy.
Confident that their mission was successful they rested a night. The next
day, Peirse marched west from Seekonk to finish the job. One of the
Captain's guides spotted a few enemies in the distance and Peirse
ordered

the entire company

to

pursue them. Unaware

that

the

Narragansetts had set a trap, his c o m p a n y found itself in the center of an
ambush, outnumbered by hundreds. According to George Bodge, the
colonists lost fifty-two English a n d eleven Indians that day. 5 Peirse a n d
Fuller were a m o n g those killed.
The c a m p a i g n to save Rehoboth was as effective as hitting a
hornet-nest with a stick. The Narragansetts replied to Peirse's attack by
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taking Rehoboth on 28 March and burning nearly eighty houses a n d
barns. 6 A day later. Providence suffered an attack that left it immobilized
for the duration of the war. Enemy forces pushed closer to Plymouth.
There was a change in attitude a m o n g colonial authorities in Boston
a n d Plymouth. Days after the report c a m e in that Peirse's company was
ambushed, Plymouth ordered "the number of three hundred Indians, well
fitted to go forth, a n d be ready for a march by the eleventh of April
next." 7 Boston a n d Plymouth were now willing to use Indians in the militia.
What happened in February 1675/6? Why did the Council of War
refuse Church his Indians on 20 February a n d only a week later order
Captain Peirse to march with a company of almost thirty Indians?
This thesis attempts to answer that question. Captain

Church

requested Indians at a time when the colonies still believed that they
could win a war without Indian support. Until 21 February 1675/6,
Massachusetts, Plymouth, a n d Rhode Island authorities did not authorize
the use of Indians in the war. Colonial authorities believed that all Indians
shared a c o m m o n racial identity a n d would help Philip's war-effort from
within. Thus, for the first eight months, the colonists spent their resources
keeping Indians out of the war as allied combatants. Additionally, only
Connecticut authorized the use of Indians as combatants, spies, a n d
informants during the early months of the war.
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This thesis divides King Philip's War into two halves: the first stage
occurs between June 1675 a n d February 1675/6, a n d the remaining
second stage that takes place between March 1675/6 a n d August 1676.
During the first half of the war, the colonists held on to their Old
World phalanx-style methods. They believed that part of their identity as
Englishmen c a m e from their military structure. To a d o p t the Indian method
of skulking meant that the wilderness had consumed them. It also meant
that they were admitting that Old World c o m b a t was not effective
against enemy combatants. Thus, for the first eight months of the war the
colonists kept Indians out of the war a n d held onto their military identity.
By February, Philip's forces h a d accumulated important alliances.
Most notably, the Narragansetts, Agawams, and Nipmucks joined in the
campaign against the colonies. These groups won battles at strategic
locations causing the colonies

to suffer heavy

damages

to

their

infrastructure. The Indian confederacy under Philip swelled in population
a n d during many battles dwarfed colonial militia companies.
On 21 February 1675/6, the colonies announced that they were so
far in debt that they could not continue the war. 8 In Chapter 2, I call this
announcement the "February Declaration." At the time the Declaration
was m a d e , the colonial authorities were forced to reevaluate their military
strategy. On the one hand, the colonies could keep their Old World a n d
racially divided style of warfare a n d lose the war; or they could use
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Indians a n d skulking, and lose their military identity. Peirse's campaign at
Seekonk was the first major change toward a racially inclusive militia. It
was also at this moment that the colonists d e c i d e d that they valued their
lives over their old identity.
This thesis shifts the turning point of the war from April 1676 to
February 1675/6. Douglas E. Leach argues that the tide turned when the
colonists shifted from a defensive to offensive war in the early months of
spring. The argument in this thesis, however, contends that the shift was
not a physical victory but rather a psychological change to warfare
techniques. The colonists were p l a c e d in a struggle for survival a n d were
losing. In February, that struggle c a m e to a peak. Captain Peirse's
expedition was symbolic of the colonies' realization that the Old World
methods were no longer effective in the New World.
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, Spies and
Informants, discusses Indians as information gatherers for the colonies.
During the war, colonial officers found that Indians could be used to
gather information regarding the enemy forces' location, size, a n d
expected attacks. By April 1676, colonial leaders had gathered such
precise information that they prevented major d a m a g e to the western
settlements.
The second chapter deals primarily with friendly Indians in the
colonial militia. This study defines friendly Indians as any Indian who
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viewed himself as an individual in the same struggle for survival as the
colonists. Often, but not all the time, these were Christian Indians who h a d
been born in settlement towns a n d were raised by the English. It outlines
the importance of friendly Indians at a time when the colonies were
nearly out of money, provisions, a n d soldiers. Friendly Indians, who h a d
remained loyal to the colonies, provided the militia with hundreds of men
willing to fight.
Finally, the third chapter illustrates the importance of Indian skulking
tactics. It shows that toward the beginning of the war, colonial forces
were ill prepared for c o m b a t in America. They often marched loudly
through the woods, waited for their enemy in open fields, and carried
heavy armor that slowed them down. As a result, these fighters were easy
targets for a quick, silent, and invisible enemy. When the colonial
authorities a d o p t e d friendly Indians into the colonial militia, the former
taught the English proper skulking techniques that saved hundreds of lives.
This thesis will argue that when the colonies used Indians in King
Philip's War, the Indians significantly contributed to the colonial victory. By
arguing that February 1675/6 was the major turning point in the war, this
thesis identifies the definitive moment when colonial tactics, ideology,
and identity c h a n g e d . Chapter two a n d three compare the pre-February
war with the post-February war. This comparative method allows the thesis
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to illustrate how successful the colonists were after they adopted Indians
and Indian tactics into the colonial militia.

NOTES

1

Thomas Church, Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which Began in the
Month of June 1675 (Boston, 1716), 19.
2

Church, Enterta/'n/ng Passages, 19.

3

George Madison Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War being A Critical Account of That
War with A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677 (Baltimore,
MD: Clearfiled Company, Inc. 2002), 331.
4

Ibid, 347-9.

s Ibid.
6 Ibid, 331.
7PCR, V: 192-3.
s RGCMB V: 70.
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CHAPTER I

SPIES AND INFORMANTS

Accomplished spies leave few traces. Informants hope that their
activities will remain covert. For those keeping their true natures in the
shadows, even as they b e c o m e cultural a n d political border crossers,
continued safety requires secrecy before, during, a n d after a mission. It
was

no different

in the seventeenth

century. Though the

English

d e p e n d e d on Indian informants and spies throughout King Philip's War,
the written record of their activities is thin. This vacuum c a n be explained
by the need to protect indigenous espionage figures even after the war's
end. Despite their absence from many records, Indian informants a n d
spies were vital allies in the war against Philip.
If Jill Lepore is correct, that King Philip's War was also a battle of
words, a n d that in its aftermath the colonists disassociated themselves
from Indians by writing histories, the accounts of Indians as key figures in
the English victory will necessarily be few and far between. 1 This is a
second factor complicating the historian's attempt to understand the role
of Indian spies and informants in the 1670s.
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For the purpose of this chapter, informants are individuals that
supplied the English with information on the enemy's position, strength,
a n d population without concealing their identity. These Indians ranged
from captives, friendly Indians, formerly hostile Indians, a n d runaways. In
some cases, informants tortured the enemy for information and relayed
the intelligence to colonists. Other times, they knew where the enemy's
position was because they had either been with or seen the enemy at
one time.
Historians who have written about King Philip's War have shown that
colonists used spies. Yet they skim over or ignore the spies' contribution to
the English victory in 1676. In Douglas E. Leach's Flintlock &

Tomahawk,

Leach briefly mentions the role of Indian spies. He argues that the colonists
were more prepared for a Nipmuck attack in February 1675/6 when they
were presented with information gathered and presented to them by the
Indians.2 Unfortunately, his argument that the war was "a struggle for
survival between two mutually antagonistic civilizations, and only a total
victory of one side or the other would be likely to settle the matter" insists
that the war was bifurcated - or separated by two different identities. 3
Thus, instead of recognizing spies a n d informants for their contributions, he
believes that had "Gookin a c t e d with less speed a n d determination" after
a spy told him of the Nipmuck raid, "the ensuing event might have h a d a
far different ending." 4 Leach believes that it was Gookin's response, not
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the Indian's intelligence that c h a n g e d the course of events. Additionally,
Leach writes, it was not the spy's information that saved the western
settlements from destruction, but rather the arrival of Captain Samuel
Wadsworth's company that "helped turn the tide." 5 According to Leach,
Indian informants played a peripheral role in the outcome of King Philip's
War.
Historians now a c c e p t that the war was not as racially divided as
Leach believed. Richard R. Johnson maintains that the

"enduring

characterization that pits white man against Indian has a satisfying
simplicity that has too often obscured a more complex reality." 6 More
recent historians argue that while the war, in the words of James Drake,
"certainly had an ethnic dimension," allegiances "did not derive solely
from ethnicity." 7 In King Philip's War some Indians were fighting the same
struggle for survival as the English colonists.
In their analysis of that

struggle

historians

have

missed

the

significance of Indian spies a n d informants. Daniel Mandell argues that in
February 1675/6 spies "saw several things that would augur the course of
the war over the next few months." 8 Mandell does not consider the
significance of spies in the war. Rather, he argues that their information
was true a n d provided the English with valuable insight. Rather than
acknowledge his activities as an informant for the English, Jill Lepore
contends that John Sassamon was killed because of his "ability to act as a
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mediator" a n d that it was "bilingualism a n d his literacy" that led to his
murder. 9 Philip Ranlet argues that Sassamon represents multiple identities
as both Indian a n d English a n d historians can use Sassamon's identities to
understand New England legal practices. 10 James Drake, claims that
Sassamon was the epitome of a failed strategy of Indian integration into
European culture. Sassamon, for Drake, was a diplomat who offered Philip
protection under the colonial government a n d , as a result, died. 11 None
of these

authories see Sassamon as an

informant

who

provided

intelligence of Philip's planned attack. Thus, these authors miss the
significance of Indians as spies a n d informants by only focusing on the role
they played as mediators between two cultures rather than on their
intelligence during times of conflict and crisis.
Rather than focus on the border-crossing abilities a n d information
gathering of Indian spies a n d informants, this chapter will examine the
information those spies gathered a n d its effects. Furthermore, this chapter
will suggest that Sassamon a n d other Indians provided the colonists with
information on impending attacks. This chapter asks how beneficial the
information gathered by Indians was to the colonists. In some instance, it
was unquestionably beneficial, as when colonial authorities heeded
warnings that saved western settlements from destruction. From the
Mohegans and Pequots that tortured their captives, to those that
deserted Philip's forces with key intelligence on his strategies, location.
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and strength, this chapter will offer a new perspective on the use of Indian
informants a n d spies during King Philip's War.

JOHN SASSAMON

The first time John Sassamon shows up in the records is as an
interpreter for Increase Mather a n d John Eliot in the 1640s.12 After his
conversion to Christianity, Sassamon worked with Eliot to translate the Bible
into Algonquian. His achievements earned him a reputation as "a man of
eminent parts & wit." 13 He then spent his time in Natick, Massachusetts
proselytizing to other Indians while teaching them reading a n d writing. 14
Eventually, in 1653, he attended Harvard University along with four other
prominent Indian men. 15
Nine years later Sassamon left the English to live with Alexander, the
Wampanoag sachem who took power in 1660 after his father, Massasoit,
died. When Alexander died in 1662 his brother, Philip, ascended into the
position of sachem. 16 Sassamon b e c a m e Philip's assistant, and Philip
seemed to trust Sassamon to translate any contracts made between the
Wampanoags a n d the English.17 As Lepore argues, "the same skills that
made Sassamon valuable to Eliot now m a d e him almost indispensable to
Philip."18 The sachem could not speak or read English, and, thus,
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Sassamon's mark appears on many of Philip's contracts m a d e between
1663 a n d 1670, proving that he was a valued assistant.
The records are not clear about Sassamon after 1672. One source
states that he "was sent to preach to the Namaskets, a n d other Indians of
Middleborough." 1 9 Another reports that he was with Philip until the winter
of 1675.20 Others maintain that he was still under the protection of the
colonies a n d was used as a mediator between various Indian groups a n d
colonial authorities. 2 ' Wherever Sassamon was in 1674, he was at least
close enough to Philip to gather information regarding the mounting
conflict; he was, also, close enough to Philip for the sachem to know that
Sassamon was aware of his plans. 22
In January 1675 John Sassamon travelled to Plymouth Colony with
information that Philip, sachem of the Wampanoags a n d Pokanokets, was
preparing for war against them. 23 Sassamon had spent the past ten years
as one of Philip's counselors, a n d he knew that Philip would kill him if the
colonies learned of his plan to attack them. It was with a great personal
risk that Sassamon told Governor Josiah Winslow the colonies, colonists,
a n d both of their lives were in danger. 24
Winslow had heard reports such as these many times before from
other Indians. Sometime in early 1671, an unnamed Indian reported that
Philip was preparing for war against Plymouth. 25 The sachem was called to
Taunton, Massachusetts to answer for these claims. In a treaty on 10 April
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1671 (Treaty of Taunton), Philip admitted that he had "broken
Covenant

this my

with my Friends, by taking up Arms, with evil intent

against

them."26 To rectify the situation, Philip agreed to give Plymouth ail of his
firearms a n d weapons "for their security so long
reason."27

as they shall see

Plymouth believed that they had averted war through this

agreement.
According to George Bodge, in April 1675 a Christian Indian named
Waban " c a m e to Gen. Gookin a n d warned him of Philip's intention shortly
to attack the English."28 He continued, "the Wampanoags intended
Mischief a n d were only waiting for the Trees to leave out, that they might
the easier conceal themselves after they had begun." 2 9 Waban probably
felt

comfortable

telling

this to

Gookin

since

the

latter

was

the

superintendent of Indian affairs in Massachusetts Bay Colony. There is no
account of General Gookin's reaction to this information. Additionally,
there is no record of whether Waban knew Sassamon or how he c a m e
across this information. Waban went to Gookin again in May "and urged
the same a n d said that...the Indians would fall upon the towns." 30
By 1675, Winslow seems to have expected these rumors. Since 1660,
colonial authorities nearly always called Indians sachems to answer for
rumors that they were conspiring against the colonies. These meetings
had b e c o m e a regular occurrence in New England. Sassamon a n d
Waban were no different than those that c a m e before them. The
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information just as plausible, a n d both had respectable reputations in
New England. But this time Winslow dismissed the informants and ignored
the warnings. 31 One month after Sassamon left Plymouth, he was found
d e a d in Assawompset Pond. 32 Five months later, in June 1675, Plymouth
executed Sassamon's suspected murderers (three W a m p a n o a g Indians);
two days later Philip held a war d a n c e in preparation for war. 33
Sassamon carried information that

might have c h a n g e d

the

outcome of King Philip's War - or prevented the war altogether. The
colonies were not prepared, militarily or strategically, for war when
hostilities broke out in June 1675. The Massachusetts General Court did not
met until 9 July 1675 - several weeks after Philip first attacked Swansea. 34
Kyle Zelner says that the "court began to prepare for conflict" only after
they met in July, a n d voted "for several war taxes...to amass supplies for
an army." 35 Plymouth responded a week earlier but took several weeks to
send troops on an expedition against Philip's forces. 36 By the time
Massachusetts

and

Plymouth

companies

arrived,

Swansea

and

surrounding towns lay in ruins. Philip's forces had killed ten English colonists
in two towns before the Plymouth Colony acknowledged that the war
had begun. 3 7
Sasssamon a n d Waban were informants who provided the English
with credible information that would have, perhaps, saved many lives in
1675 a n d 1676. Yet, the colonists during the early summer of 1675 were not
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yet prepared to rely on Indian informants. Nevertheless, the information
Sassamon carried might have cost Philip the war. In the words of
Nathaniel Saltonstall, "King Philip suspecting he either would divulge or
h a d already made known this Secret to the English, took Councel to kill
this Sosoman." 38 Sassamon's role as an informant caused his death.

THE MOHEGANS AND PEQUOTS AS INFORMANTS

In August 1675, John Pynchon, found of Springfield, sent a letter to
Governor John Winthrop Jr. of Connecticut. He explained the usefulness
of Indians as informants in the war against Philip. Pynchon explained that
"Philip with forty of his men is now at a place called Ashquoach a little on
this side of Quabog." 3 9 He continued, "our Indians judge that either Philip
will go to them at Memenimissee, or that they will c o m e to Philip at
Ashquoash, which the Indians think is rather the more convenient place
a n d so they make 250 soldiers."40 The intelligence that Pynchon relayed to
Winthrop specified that "Philip have but 30 guns, a n d the other 10 bows
a n d arrows." 41
According to the Indian informants, Philip's forces "are now weak
a n d weary a n d may be easily dealt with, whereas if w e let them
alone...they will burn our houses and kill us all by stealth." 42 Winthrop then
sent out a force of 250 soldiers, which resulted in the capture of one of
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Philip's most valuable leaders. Hartford, in a w e that the Connecticut
Indians recovered such precise information wrote to Pynchon a n d asked
for any intelligence " a n d earnestly desire as any comes to your hand it
may be posted away to us." 43
To show their support for the United Colonies, Mohegan Indians, with
their sachem

Uncas, marched into Boston a n d reported that

Narragansetts

were

hiding

Wampanoag

men

and

the

women. 4 4 The

Narragansetts posed the greatest threat to the United Colonies, a n d
Massachusetts a n d Plymouth spent much of their efforts attempting to
keep these Indians out of the war. This information led Massachusetts
authorities to judge a preemptive strike against the Rhode Island Indians
as necessary. In July 1675, Plymouth a n d Massachusetts ordered the
Narragansetts to sign a loyalty c o m p a c t ensuring that if Philip's subjects
entered into their territory, they would turn them over to the English as
prisoners.45 The Narragansetts signed a n d the colonists believe that this
agreement would keep them from fighting in the war.

THE GREAT SWAMP FIGHT OF DECEMBER 1675

Both Plymouth a n d Massachusetts were reluctant, at first, to listen to
Indian informants. While some ranking officers valued any intelligence that
could help in the campaign against Philip, the colonial authorities rarely
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authorized it. Captain Benjamin Church consistently trusted any Indian
who fought alongside his company. Early in the war, Church encountered
John Alderman, an Indian who had left Mount Hope in search of English
protection. According to Church, Alderman "gave him an account of the
State of the Indians, a n d where each of the Sagamores head quarters
were." 46 Alderman even offered to escort Church to Philip's sister-in-law
Weetamo's

territory.

After

serious

deliberations,

the

Massachusetts

authorities sent Captain Baxter, Captain Hunter, a n d Captain Church to
find Weetamo's c a m p . After a quarter-mile, the three companies found
three of the sachem's warriors a n d killed one of them. As they travelled
farther, they c a m e to their location a n d open fired. After some time, the
English forced the entire village to retreat into the swamps a n d the fort
was taken. 47
Colonial mistrust c a m e as a result of a general racial prejudice
against all Indians. This mistrust cost the colonies a great deal. Not only
were some soldiers not willing to listen to Indian informants, but also they
wanted all Indians d e a d . Captain Samuel Moseley was particularly fond
of the latter option, a n d on occasion was disciplined by his own superiors
for cruel treatment of friendly Indians.48 As Douglas E. Leach writes "Many
of the troops had nothing but contempt a n d hatred for all Indians." 49
In

October,

English

authorities

received

information

from

a

W a m p a n o a g informant that Canonchet, the Narragansett sachem, was
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planning an attack. 50 This c a m e as something of a surprise since the
English h a d signed an alliance treaty with the sachem at the outbreak of
the war. The July Treaty specified that the Narragansetts would remain
loyal to the colonists, refrain from entering the war, a n d "use all Acts of
Hostility against the said Philip & his Subjects, entring his Lands or any other
Lands of the English."51 Though the colonists were doubtful that the
Narragansetts would stay out completely, they hoped that the treaty
would pacify the Narragansetts for a short while.
Several times between July a n d October, Indians reported to
English that W a m p a n o a g canoes travelled to a n d from Narragansett
territory.52 In his contemporary history of the war, William Hubbard,
emphasized that the Narragansetts resented the contract with the English
from the beginning a n d actively w e l c o m e d Philip's men, w o m e n , a n d
children onto their land as refuges. 53 Others knew that the Narragansetts
a c c e p t e d Wampanoag messengers.54
The report in October, however, was different. This time it was an
Indian who was with Canonchet when he m a d e the plans. 55 This Indian
had

been with the

Narragansett

sachem

for several weeks

and

Canonchet. The informant knew firsthand that the Narragansetts had
breached the contract. The General Court of Massachusetts announced
that the Narragansetts "but jugle with us" a n d scheduled a preemptive
strike.56
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The colonies attacked in December 1675. Despite large numbers of
Narragansett warriors, the battle was relatively successful for the colonists.
This was due, in part, to the informants. Connecticut a n d Massachusetts
forces surprised the Narragansett warriors with a concerted

attack.

Unaware that the English knew of their plans, the Indians did not prepare
a counterattack, a n d fought a somewhat disoriented fight. 57 After hours
of battle, the English drove the Narragansetts from the fort into the
swamps in retreat. A w o u n d e d Captain Benjamin Church arrived on the
scene as the Indians retreated. He announced, "Some of the Enemy that
were then in the Fort have since inform'd us, that near a third of the
Indians belonging to all that Narroganset

Country

were killed by the

English, a n d by the Cold that Night, that they fled out of their Fort so hastily
that they carried nothing with them." 5 8 Based on this information. Church
recommended that the English take the fort for shelter a n d starve out the
Narragansett forces.
General Winslow agreed to Church's proposal. Winslow rode his
horse toward the fort with the order to preserve it. Another Captain, who
opposed Church's advise, to take shelter in the Narragansett forts, told
Winslow "That if he mov'd another step towards the Fort he would

shoot

his Horse under him."59 This stopped Winslow. The Captain then called for
the c o m p a n y doctor - who was working on Church's bullet wound - a n d
explained the situation. The doctor returned to Church a n d said "if he
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gave such advice

as that was, he should bleed

before they would endeavour

to stench his blood."60

to Death like a Dog
Church, now in fear

for his life, withdrew his recommendation. The c o m p a n y then burned the
fort to the ground.
If the Indians supplied Church with the correct information than the
soldiers could have c a m p e d in the fort and pursued the enemy after
being fully rested. The Narragansetts grew more bellicose after what was
known as the Great Swamp Fight in December 1675. The Rhode Island
tribe soon threw their lot in with Philip a n d decimated several frontier
towns in Massachusetts and burned Providence. 61 In some cases, the
United Colonies listened to their informants a n d it led them to victory;
other times the information was dismissed a n d the English forces lost
opportunities to remove serious threats.
The Great Swamp Fight of 1675 with the Narragansetts might have
turned out differently if an Indian informant had not told Plymouth Colony
that Canonchet

was planning an attack against the English. The

Narragansetts, wielded incredible strength in the region, and the United
Colonies feared them more than any other group. William Hubbard wrote
that if the Narragansetts sided with Philip "it would have been very
difficult, if possible for the English to have saved any of their inland
plantation from being utterly destroyed." 62 According to Sherborne Cook,
the Narragansett warrior population was roughly 1,000, with a reserve

22

population of almost 4,00c.63 The preemptive strike at the Narragansetts'
fort in December

1675 eliminated one-third of the Indians in all of

Narragansett territory (if w e c a n take Church's informant at his word). 64 If
all of these figures are accurate, or off by only a little, the preemptive
attack on Narragansett lands diminished their population to just over
2,600. This was a tremendous victory for the English - one that would never
have happened without the Indian informant.

UNRECOGNIZED SPIES

In his narrative "An Historical Account of the Doings a n d Sufferings
of the Christian Indians in New England," Daniel Gookin wrote the sole
surviving firsthand account of Indian spies.65 Completed in 1677, Gookin's
account was not published until 1836.66 The original manuscript is believed
lost. Many of Gookin's other works were destroyed in a fire during the early
eighteenth century. 67
As the Superintendent of Indian affairs in the Massachusetts Bay
colony, Gookin was afforded certain knowledge and control unavailable
to others.68 The colonial authorities trusted him with the responsibility of
looking after the Indians in Massachusetts. During the war Gookin used his
position to take measured risks with his Indian allies. He rarely told others of
his Indian spies, a n d since none of his contemporaries mentioned Indian
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spies in their writing, one might d e d u c e that they were unaware of Indian
spying. 69
High-ranking officers did not know about Gookin's spies, a n d in one
instance the Superintendent's secrecy almost proved fatal. By 26 October
1675, colonists feared a general uprising by all Indians in southern New
England. Colonists claimed that allegiances were ethnic, a n d that all
Indians would ally with Philip.70 Fear escalated when colonists heard that
the Nipmucks joined Philip's forces.71 Coupled with the belief that the
colonists could not tell the difference between a friendly Indian a n d an
enemy Indian, colonial authorities interned all Indians onto Deer Island in
October 1675. Other laws prevented Indians from travelling more than
one mile from their homes unless a c c o m p a n i e d by an Englishman.72 When
a corporation in London sent money, supplies, and letters for better
treatment of the Indians on Deer Island, Massachusetts authorities assured
it that "these Christian Indians [were] allies a n d friends of the English" a n d
that for their security this internment policy was necessary.73
Job Kattenanit, one of Gookin's spies, was granted permission to
travel into Nipmuck country to find his family (whom he had left to serve
the English). Captain Mosely " b e c a m e infuriated, a n d created a most
unpleasant scene in the presence of the assembled troops." 74 Mosley
represented the view that Indians were not trustworthy. Other disagreed
with Mosely a n d his supporters. During the war, colonists, soldiers, a n d
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authorities often divided over whether the English could trust Indians
during the war. Attacks by Indians on major settlements in the west
increased the division between the two sides. Despite fierce controversy
the colonists realized that their survival necessitated the ability to listen to,
learn from, and use Indians.
To protect the Indians, Gookin only told a few people of the spying
expeditions. In November

1675, Captain

Henchman's

forces,

near

Hassanamesit caught Job Kattenanit on a mission. At first there was a
heated d e b a t e over whether Henchman's company should kill the Indian
for travelling without an English chaperone and, they assumed, conspiring
against the English. Fortunately, one company officer offered Kattenanit
an opportunity to explain his situation to Captain Henchman. When the
spy showed Henchman his mission note, signed by Gookin, the Captain
admitted that he was unaware of any spy practices organized by the
colonial authorities. 75 Henchman sent Kattenanit to Boston for further
examination, a n d the spy was eventually cleared.

GOOKIN'S TWO SPIES

Job Kattenanit a n d Daniel Gookin's other spy, James Quannapohit,
gathered, perhaps, the best intelligence of the war. In December 1675,
the Narragansetts fought against the colonists in The Great Swamp Fight -
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one of the most important battles of the war. The battle made it clear the
colonies needed more information regarding the whereabouts, strength,
a n d intention of other Indian tribes who had the potential to cause severe
d a m a g e to English settlements. 76 In January 1675/6, the colonial Council
of Massachusetts asked Major Daniel Gookin to take several Christian
Indians a n d employ them as spies for the English.77 Gookin, who had spent
months trying to prove that Christian Indians could be of great use to the
colonies, a c c e p t e d the order a n d took both James Quannapohit a n d
Job Kattenanit from Deer Island to his house in Cambridge. Gookin
offered them five pounds a n d instructions before they left the city on 30
December. 78
The pair told the Nipmucks they were escaped captives from
Hassanamesit a n d that they were inquiring about the current situation of
the rebel forces. They said there were more Indians on Deer Island who
were awaiting this information so that they could help in the rebellion.
Confident that these two spies were interested in supporting the
rebellion, the Nipmucks told Kattenanit a n d Quannapohit that Philip was
near Fort Albany seeking an alliance with the Mohawks. 79 Next they told
them that they had planned a rendezvous point for themselves, the
Narragansetts, a n d the Wampanoags in early spring. After coming
together, the three tribes planned a full-scale united attack against the
English in which

they

planned

to
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destroy

several

major

towns. 80

Furthermore, in regards to their strength, the Nipmucks explained that they
"gloried much in their number a n d strength, a n d that [in] all this war their
loss of men was inconsiderable." 81 Even more shocking was that they
"boasted of their expectation to be supplied with arms a n d ammunition
and men from the French, by the hunting Indians." 82 According to this
report, not only were enemy forces still strong, united, a n d well preserved,
they expected the French to supply them with weapons.
Finally, the Nipmuck sachem, Mautampe, told the two spies that
the first full-scale attack by all three bands would be against Lancaster.
The plan was well designed. First, Nipmuck a n d Narragansett forces would
burn the only bridge into Lancaster preventing any English forces from
rescuing the town. Then they would destroy Lancaster and all the
surrounding areas before the English found their way into the area. 83
Kattenanit risked his life to retrieve information for the colonies. He
d e c i d e d to stay behind in Nipmuck territory for several days after his
partner James Quannapohit and he had gathered information about the
impending attack on Lancaster, Quannapohit pleaded with Kattenanit to
c o m e to Boston. According to Gookin, the conversation began when
Kattenanit announced, "I a m willing to venture a little longer, a n d go
down with the Indians that are to meet with the Narragansetts; and, if I
live, I may get more intelligence. And,' said he, 'if God spare my life, I
intend to c o m e away about three weeks hence." 8 4 His partner responded
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by pleading "after I a m gone, I fear the enemy will suspect us to be spies,
a n d then kill you." 8 5 These two Indians knew that they risked everything to
support the English.
In early January, Quinnapohit left the Nipmucks for Cambridge.
Kattenanit stayed with the enemy for several days longer hoping that he
could gather more intelligence. On 24 January, Quinnapohit

found

Gookin a n d warned him of the attack on Lancaster. Gookin then relayed
this information to the Council of War a n d pleaded that they send troops
to protect the surrounding towns. Not believing the severity of the threat,
Massachusetts

hesitated

in

making

a

decision

and

delayed

the

reinforcements. Days later, reports arrived that a small settlement near
Sudbury was burned to the ground a n d the Nipmucks had killed or taken
captive the inhabitants. 86 Massachusetts authorities, still cautious about
trusting Quinnapohit, sent "two mounted patrols to cover the frontier line
from Groton down to Medfield." 8 7
Two weeks later, Gookin awoke to Job Kattenanit pounding at his
door. 88 It was ten o'clock at night, a n d Kattenanit, out of breadth, c a m e
bearing very important information. 89 Kattenanit told Gookin that "Before
he c a m e from the enemy at Menemesse, a party of the Indians about
four hundred, were marched forth to attack a n d burn Lancaster; a n d , on
the morrow...they would attempt it." 90 Furthermore, the spy reported that
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he h a d stayed with the Nipmucks long enough to observe an alliance
with his hosts a n d the Narragansetts. 91
Gookin leapt out of his b e d a n d ran d o w n the street to consult
Thomas Danforth - a member of the Council of War. The two of them
spent several hours writing to local militia groups to reinforce Lancaster by
morning. Letters were sent to Marlborough, Concord, a n d Lancaster that
recommended all the townspeople to a b a n d o n their locations a n d seek
shelter in the surrounding towns. The letters warned that this attack would
consist of four hundred Narragansett a n d Nipmuck warriors, a n d that the
attack was scheduled for the next morning. 92 Gookin a n d Danforth had
done all they could d o to protect the western settlements; now they
played the waiting g a m e .
By daybreak, Captain Samuel Wadsworth, of Milton, received the
letter a n d gathered forty of his men for a march to Lancaster. When
Wadsworth's company arrived, the bridge was already burned a n d
Nipmuck a n d Narragansett forces had begun their descent onto the
town. The sight was gruesome to colonial forces. Mary Rowlandson, who
was captured by Nipmuck warriors during this attack, wrote the following
in her narrative:

The first coming was about Sun-rising; hearing the
noise of some Guns, w e looked out; several
Houses were burning, a n d the Smoke ascending
to Heaven. There were five persons taken in one
29

house, the Father, a n d the Mother a n d a sucking
Child, they knockt on the head; the other two
they took and carried away alive. There were
two others, who being out of their Garison upon
some occasion were set upon; one was knockt
on the h e a d , the other escapted: Another their
was who running along was shot a n d w o u n d e d ,
a n d fell down; he b e g g e d of them his life,
promising them Money...but they would not
hearken to him but knockt him in head, a n d stript
him naked, a n d split open his Bowels.93

For several hours, the Nipmuck a n d Narragansett forces burned houses,
killed a n d dismembered civilians, a n d destroyed crops. The Nipmucks,
especially, h a d no sympathy for these inhabitants. In one instance, the
Indians scalped a man, stripped him naked, a n d w a t c h e d as he crawled
away in agony. 94
Wadsworth discovered another bridge into the area that the
enemy had partly destroyed by pulling off the planks; he used it to
engage the Indian forces. 95 His company immediately fortified a garrison
house owned

by a local inhabitant

Cyprian Stevens.96 The militia

company split: one half stayed at the garrison a n d continued the pitched
battle, while the other tried to retrieve another garrison-house within the
town. This latter building protected another bridge that if it were fortified
would allow allied forces the opportunity to sandwich the Indians in a twopronged battle. The Indians, who realized this, raced Wadsworth's forces
to the garrison a n d burned it before it was fortified. 97 Wadsworth, a n d the
rest of his men, retreated, a n d Lancaster was destroyed.
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Boston authorities brought

Kattenanit

in for information. With

Lancaster now demolished, Boston authorities wondered where the
Nipmuck and Narragansett forces would strike next. Kattenanit informed
them that the plan was to attack Medfield, Groton, a n d Marlborough with
forces from the Lancaster raid. 98 Massachusetts' authorities sent out Major
Thomas Savage a n d Captain Mosely to Medfield with between five
hundred a n d six hundred m e n . " On 21 February, colonial forces found
fifty houses burned to the ground a n d many d e a d residents.100 The Indians
had not finished with the town when Major Savage's company arrived.
With nearly double the amount of soldiers, colonial forces drove the
Indians

back

into

the

swamps

and

saved

Medfield

from

total

destruction. 101
Based on the information provided to the authorities by Kattenanit,
Boston reinforced both Groton a n d Marlborough two days after the
Medfield fight. While they m a n a g e d to stave off some attacks, the Indians
seemed to be everywhere. After the Medfield fight Mary Sheppard, w h o m
the Nipmucks had captured on 12 February, was released. When the
English c a m e upon her, she informed them that the Indians "were in three
Towns beyond Quobaog. 1 0 2 Major Savage and Captain Mosely split their
forces to cover more ground. Somewhere near Q u o b o a g , Mosely met
with Major Treat's Connecticut forces a n d drove the Indians back into the
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swamps. 103 Mosely was injured in the battle a n d both officers d e e m e d it
unwise to chase the enemy into the woods.
Information soon c a m e that the Indians had already planned an
attack

near

Northampton,

Massachusetts.

According

to

Nathaniel

Saltonstall in 1676, enemy forces were not aware that the English had
recovered

information

on

the

attack

and

"found

such

warm

Entertainment [and] had kindled their Fire."104 When Major Savage arrived
with a company of roughly five hundred soldiers the Nipmuck a n d
Narragansett warriors "were forced to fly with great Confusion."' 05 An
informant told Savage that the Indians still had a larger contingency
force, a n d the informant believed that if Savage stayed at his location the
English could drive the Indians into an ambush at Deerfield. 106 Nipmuck
forces returned with one thousand warriors to find two English companies
prepared for battle. Major Savage's groups "pursued them to their usual
Place of Rendezvous near Deerfield"

and forced the Indians into

retreat. 107
February 1675/6 was a particularly difficult month for English forces.
The Indians attacked fifty-two towns, pillaged twenty-five, a n d destroyed
seventeen. 108 Indians also destroyed towns that supported troops with
food, provisions, a n d rations. Colonial authorities realized that a b a n d o n e d
towns put more pressure on soldiers. With minimal resistance remaining in
the towns, Indian forces marched toward Boston a n d Plymouth without
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trouble. To prevent abandonment, the Courts ordered that "it shall not be
in the liberty of any person what soever who is by law enjoyned to
trayne...ward or scout to leave the Towne he is an Inhabitant of upon any
pretence whatsoever...upon the penalty of twenty pounds." 109 People in
the areas south of Boston had begun moving closer to the city for
protection, a n d

Boston authorities w a n t e d

this to stop. Wrentham

colonists, for example, a b a n d o n e d their town in the spring 1676 a n d
migrated north to Dedham. 1 1 0
Colonial forces had survived the first w a v e of onslaughts. Spies were
to thank for this. Gookin's two spies, James Quannapohit a n d Job
Kattenanit, provided the English with information that proved vital. If
Kattenanit had not informed Gookin of the impending attack

on

Lancaster, and the several later attacks, the English might have Isot all of
the major settlements west of Marlborough.

THE WAR SHIFTS

As the war shifted toward a colonial offensive in April, more Indians
surrendered to English authority. Colonial authorities received information
on where Philip was a n d where he was attacking next. On 10 April 1676,
Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote, an informant told one company "that the
Enemy h a d a designe, on the next Day, to fall upon the Garrison, a n d
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some few Houses that remained at Marlborough, to revenge the Death of
one of their eminent Men that was slain when they were last there." 111
Quickly, Major General Winslow went with a company of men to meet
Major Thomas Savage in Boston. They consulted with Captain Mosely a n d
planned an expedition for the next day. When the forces arrived in
Marlborough they did not find the enemy and were called back to
Boston. The English a b a n d o n e d Marlborough too soon, however. Days
later Boston received information that Philip's forces had waited for the
colonial militia to leave before attacking. Everything in Marlborough,
except the Garrison, was destroyed. 112 The informant gave them the
correct information, but impatience cost another settlement.
On 21 April, Gookin received information from one of his Indians
that Philip's remaining forces numbered at 1,500 a n d that they h a d
burned Sudbury to the ground. 113 Almost immediately after hearing this.
Captain Hugh Mason was sent, with several other forces, to Sudbury.
Philip, surprised that the English arrived so quickly, retreated into a local
riverbed. By the time Philip gathered his troops for a counterattack, the
English had secured the only bridge into the town. Shortly, thereafter,
three more companies arrived as reinforcements under Captain Prentiss,
Corporal Phipps, a n d the Indian company of Captain Hunting. 114 The
three reinforcement forces arrived one day later on 22 April to find that
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the enemy had already withdrawn during the previous night. The Sudbury
fight was a victory for the colonists.115
As the war neared its end, colonial forces enjoyed victory after
victory over Philip's forces. In his A True Account
Occurrences,

of the Most

Considerable

Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote that the English should not forget

the Indian informants, who "have done us considerable Services."116 He
continued,

they serve especially for Spies a n d Scouts to
[stalk] the skulking Enemy, a n d drive them out of
the Swamps a n d Woods, a n d then the English
can the better fight them, and indeed our
greatest Exercise hath been to find the Enemy
rather than to Fight them, unless they be very
much Superior in Numbers. But now the Indians
dread our Approaches with those
Indian
Vancourriers, a n d the Lord hath caused much of
his Terror to fall upon them. 117

CONCLUSION

When colonial forces a c t e d on the information that spies a n d
informants retrieved they saved themselves from disaster. Information on
Philip's forces afforded the English the opportunity for preemptive attacks
against the Narragansetts, Nipmucks, a n d Wampanoags. It also better
prepared the English. The attack at Lancaster, in February 1675/6, could
have

devastated

western

Massachusetts
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and

paralyzed

colonial

reinforcements if Kattenanit had not informed the colonies of the
attack. 118 The intelligence that Mohegans a n d Pequots brought to the
Connecticut colony early in the war forced the capture of several of
Philip's most valued leaders. According to George Bodge, Connecticut
did not suffer the damages of its neighboring colonies because it chose to
use Indians from the earliest stages of the war. 119 Massachusetts a n d
Plymouth, however, trusted their spies only after they suffered significantly
greater losses. During the latter half of the war, spies and informants
provided Massachusetts a n d Plymouth with opportune successes.
The colonies suffered devastating losses when they did not heed
the information gathered by informants. Governor Josiah Winslow could
have protected the southern a n d western settlements with reinforcements
after Sassamon a n d Waban informed him of Philip's plans. He also could
have also prepared the colonies for war with a reformed a n d improved
military system. Kyle Zelner illustrates how unprepared New England was
for this conflict, a n d why they suffered so many losses during the early
stages of war. 120
Spies a n d informants were willing to risk their lives to get correct
information to their English allies. The information provided by Indians that
Philip's forces were near New York seeking aid from the Mohawks was
accurate, a n d it allowed Plymouth a n d Massachusetts an opportunity to
petition to Governor Andros of New York.'21 When Kattenanit
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and

Quannapohit told Gookin that the Nipmucks a n d Narragansetts were
planning an attack on Lancaster for the morning of 10 February, the
intelligence was verified. When Indians warned of an attack against
Marlborough in April 1676, the attack c a m e - though the English had
disbanded. When Sassasmon a n d Waban told Governor Winslow that
Philip was scheduling a war with the colonies, it c a m e . These Indians
provided colonists with up-to-date, honest, a n d correct information that,
when h e e d e d , saved the colonies.
Friendly Indians in King Philip's War played a crucial role in helping
the English prevent

Philip from achieving victory. Their information

prevented the Nipmucks from advancing into Boston. The information also
enabled the colonists to surprise-attack the Narragansetts a n d minimize
their fighting forces before the tribe entered the war. Spies and informants
risked their lives to gather intelligence on Philip's forces' location, size, a n d
strength. Without this information, Philip's allies may have inflicted greater
devastations from which the colonies may not have recovered.
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American

CHAPTER II

'TCANNOTl DO OUR WORK WITHOUT THEM"

Throughout the seventeenth century, Indian alliances were essential
to the survival of New England's English settlements. From the earliest
attempt at establishing permanent footholds, the colonists were aware of
their vulnerability to attack by European competitors a n d indigenous
nations, a n d formed English-Indian compacts whose military elements
included wartime mutual aid. The first treaty "to confirme a Peace"
occurred at Plymouth in March 1620/1. The six part agreement established
by Governor John Carver, the Wampanoag sachem of the Pokanoket
Massasoit, and their various councilors, stipulated, "That neither he
[Massasoit] nor any of his should injure or d o hurt to any of our people." It
also said, "If any did unjustly war against him [Massasoit], w e would aid
him; if any did war against us, he should aid us."1 In 1636, shortly before
the outbreak of the Pequot War, the Narragansetts entered into a similar
agreement with the Massachusetts Bay Colony. 2 Two years later, after the
close of the war, the Mohegans signed a similar treaty with both the
Narragansetts a n d the English in Connecticut. 3 Over the course of
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decades, these documents influenced trade relations, military actions,
Christian missions, Indian sovereignty a n d land transactions. 4
This chapter will look at the use of Indians as combatants during
King Philip's War. It describes the war in three parts. First, it will discuss the
early fear a m o n g colonists that the Indians were united in conspiracy
against the colonies. Next, the chapter will address the mid-war period
when Philip's forces had tremendous success in recruitment a n d c o m b a t .
Colonists soon realized that keeping friendly Indians out of the war
brought

significant

losses. The

third

section

will

discuss

the

vital

reintroduction of Indians into the militia companies. In summation, this
chapter argues that without the help of Indian alliances a n d warriors, New
England would not have survived the war.
Furthermore, this chapter will address another aspect of King Philip's
War alliances. The c o m m o n assumption among scholarly research is that
the turning point of the war was April 1676 when Mohawk raids a n d
starvation weakened Philip's forces. 5 This chapter will argue that the
turning point in the war c a m e earlier in February 1675/6 when the colonies
found themselves nearly out of soldiers, economically in debt, a n d unable
to supply military companies with firearms or provisions. The decision to
readmit Indians into the war as allies, at the point the colonists f a c e d
complete economic a n d military failure eventually shifted the war from a
defensive to offensive operation. This chapter believes that the turning

45

point of the war was not a physical victory, as other scholars have argued,
but rather a strategic shift. Thus, the most important moment in the war
was what this chapter will call the "February Declaration" when a
Massachusetts council d e c i d e d that the colonies could no

longer

continue the war without a change.

EARLY ALLIANCES

The first war in New England occurred in 1636 a n d lasted until 1638.
The Pequot War, as it is now known, was a struggle between English
forces, their Indian allies, a n d the Pequots of southern New England.
According to sources, the two Indian groups that allied with the English,
Narragansett a n d Mohegans, a c t e d as interpreters, strategists, diplomats,
consultants, and informants. In Captain John Underhill's account he
emphasized his reliance on one Indian warrior. Underhill wrote, "wee had
an Indian with us that was an interpreter, being in English cloathes, a n d a
Gunne in his hand." Taking notice of the Indian, some Pequots asked,
"what are you an Indian or an English-man" to which the interpreter
responded, " c o m e hither...and I will tell you." The interpreter then shot
d e a d the curious Indians.6
Indians also served as guides that helped the English navigate
unfamiliar terrain. John Endecott, in 1636, marched with two Indian guides
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that led him through the swamps a n d forests of Connecticut. 7 The English
valued Indians as guides a n d strategists since they supplied information on
who the "enemy was, where they were, how to get there, what their
probably intentions were, a n d keeping that kind of information up to d a t e
over time." 8 When William Bradford recounted the events of the Pequot
War years later, he mentioned how useful the Indians were in bringing the
soldiers to enemy forts.9
Indian alliances also swelled the numbers of English militias.
Sherburne Cook estimates that the entire Pequot community numbered
roughly 3,000 in 1637, with approximately 1,000 warriors.10 At a battle in
Mystic, Connecticut, the colonial Court sent only fifty English volunteers to
fight against roughly 400 men, w o m e n , and children. 11 Expecting to be
outnumbered,

military

leaders

requested

the

help

of

both

the

Narragansetts a n d Mohegans who each supplied the English with several
hundred warriors. With their military support the English surrounded a n d
burned Pequot villages.

FEAR OF A GENERAL UPRISING

At the outbreak of King Philip's War in June 1675, many paranoid
colonists feared that an ethnic a n d racial identity would promote a
concerted pan-Indian campaign against the colonies. John Easton wrote
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that the "English were jealous that there was a general plot of all Indians
against the English."12 William Harris, in Rhode Island, e c h o e d Easton's
observation. 13 William Hubbard argued that when fighting began other
Indians were eager "or might soon be perswaded to joyn with him in
acting this bloudy Tragedy." 14 A resident of Warwick, Rhode Island,
insisted, "There is a rumour as though all the Indians were in combination
and confederacie to exterpate a n d root out the English, which many
feare." 15 Years later, Captain Benjamin Church recalled that Plymouth
colonists feared all Indians " h a d form'd a design of War upon the
English."16
These fears were perpetuated by the many reports claiming Philip
had sent messengers to neighboring sachems in hopes of an alliance. 17
Reports acknowledged that Philip had sent messengers to Awashonks the
tribal leader of the Sagkonets to ask for her support. Captain Church
confirmed this report when the sachem told him that six of Philip's men
had already spent days convincing her to ally with his forces. 18 Governor
Roger Williams of Rhode Island wrote that he had seen canoes traveling
from Philip's territory of Mount Hope to the Narragansetts. 19 William
Hubbard emphasized that the Narragansetts received several emissaries
before the war b e g a n a n d agreed to protect Philip's men, women, a n d
children during wartime. 20 Other colonists heard of Philip dispatching
messengers to several tribes in the attempt to secure a confederacy. 2 1
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Alliances between

English colonies were quite different

than

alliances between Indians. English alliances were based on a shared
identity a n d language. 2 2 When Roger Williams offered Plymouth his
support in the war, despite political differences, he claimed "all the
Colonies were Subject to one K[ing] Charles a n d it was his pleasure a n d
our Duty and Engagement for one English man to stand to the Death by
Each other in all parts of the world." 2 3 John Easton, who was irritated that
Massachusetts a n d Connecticut entered Rhode Island a n d formed a
compact

with

the

Narragansetts

without

permission, agreed

that

"when...English blood was spilt" it " e n g a g e d all Englishmen, for w e were
to be all under one king." 24
Unlike the English, Indian alliances were fragile. This was because, as
Jenny Hale Pulsipher writes, Indians needed to emphasize that the
confederacy was one of "political choice rather than ethnicity." 25 Indians
did not have a transnational identity. Howard Russell maintains, "various
tribes had from time to time battled or displaced one another even
though speaking dialects of a c o m m o n language." 2 6 Thus, when Philip
sought alliances with other Indian groups he used fear to pressure them to
join. Philip's six men at Sogkonate told Awashonks that if she refused
Philip's offer they would "kill the English Cattel, a n d burn their Houses on
that side [of] the River, which would provoke the English to fall upon her,
whom they would without doubt suppose the author of the Mischief."27 His
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messengers told other sachems, "the English had a Design to cut off all
the Indians round about them, a n d that if they did not Joyn together, they
should lose their Lives and Lands."28
New England's colonial authorities believed that swift, unilateral
action could sever alliances among the Indians a n d shorten the war's
length. Fearing a pan-Indian alliance against them, they continued this
practice

throughout

much

of

the

war.

Governor

Roger

Williams

emphasized how vitally necessary it was to keep the Mohegans a n d
Narragansetts from entering into the war. 29 Plymouth sent

Captain

Benjamin Church to meet Awashonks, request her continued loyalty " a n d
shelter her self, a n d People under [their] Protection. 30 Instead of asking
Awashonks to supply the English with fighters, he insisted that she a n d her
people remain "within [their] own limits of Sogkonate"

a n d stay out of the

war. 31
Suspicion

of

treachery

was

one

of

the

barriers

to

English

a c c e p t a n c e of Native assistance. After meeting with Awashonks, Church
was sent to the Pocasset tribe with a similar proposal for another sachem,
Weetamoo. 3 2 Plymouth sent two additional messengers to the Nipmuck
Indians asking them to reinstate their allegiance

to the

colony. 33

Massachusetts authorities sent Captain Edward Hutchinson and Captain
Thomas Wheeler into western Massachusetts to request the allegiance of
the Q u a b a u g Indians.34 One Springfield resident, John Pynchon, wrote a

50

letter to Governor Winthrop Jr. informing him that the Mohegans and
Pequots were "our professed friends" a n d cannot be allowed to join with
Philip.35 Almost immediately, Winthrop sent messengers to the Connecticut
Indians asking for their allegiance.
During the early stages of the war potentially hostile Indians were
instructed to remain on their lands to prevent any English suspicion. The
Narragansetts were of particular interest to the United Colonies. Both the
Connecticut a n d Massachusetts Bay authorities sent messengers into
Rhode Island in July 1675 to prevent the Narragansetts from entering the
war. 36
The agreement instructed the Narragansetts to resolve any hostilities
between the English a n d the Indians; reinstate their loyalty to the colonies;
a n d "use all Acts of Hostility against the said Philip & his Subjects, entring
his Lands or any other Lands of the English."37 The Articles, signed by four
Narragansett leaders, six colonial authorities, and a translator, insisted that
the Narragansetts only join the war if Philip, or Philip's warriors, a p p e a l e d
to the Narragansetts on their land. Though Jenny Hale Pulsipher argues
that the agreement called for Narragansetts to provide "active assistance
against Philip's forces," the colony did not stipulate that Indians needed
to seek and kill Philip.38 Instead, the Article instructed the Narragansetts to
remain on guard on their own lands.39
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Colonists in Massachusetts suspected that the Natick Christian
Indians might join Philip's forces. In October 1675, these Indians were
removed to Deer Island by order of the Massachusetts Bay authorities for
"our security." 40 The following month, the Massachusetts Court ordered,
"none of the said Indians...shall presume to go off the said islands upon
pain of death; a n d it shall be lawful for the English to destroy those that
they find straggling off from the said place of their confinement." 41 The
Court also restricted "any person or persons" from taking, stealing, or
carrying "away either man, w o m a n , or child of the said Indians, off from
any

the

said island where

they

are

placed." 4 2 In Mendon,

the

"Hassanemesit Indians [were] ordered to [build] a fort...and to move
there with their families as soon as their corn crop was harvested." 43 Thus,
even Indians that did not identify with Philip's rebellion were under close
surveillance. More so, these Christian Indians were instructed to keep out
of the war.

CONNECTICUT AND ITS INDIAN ALLIES

Unlike its neighbor colonies, Connecticut authorities quickly realized
the usefulness of Indian allies. The colony saw the Mohegans a n d Pequots
as "our professed friends." 44 Governor John Winthrop Jr. a n d Springfield
founder John Pynchon, immediately after the outbreak of King Philip's
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War, encouraged the use of Indian scouts, fighters, interpreters, a n d
guides. Winthrop as early as June 1676, sent Captain Cudworth into battle
with

several

friendly

Indians.45 One

month

later,

Captain

Edward

Hutchinson rode with three Indian guides a n d translators to convince the
Nipmucks to renew their loyalty to the colony. 46 Others, like Captain
Prentice, rallied a few friendly Indians for their companies. 47 To show their
support a n d appreciation, Mohegan a n d Pequot Indians brought the
scalps of their enemy to Connecticut authorities. 48
As a result of this alliance, Connecticut was "saved [from] many
disasters, a n d secured many substantial victories." 49 By August 1675, John
Pynchon sent a letter to John Winthrop Jr. informing him that a friendly
Indian brought intelligence that "Philip with forty of his men [are] now at a
place called Ashquoach a little on this side of Quabaug." 5 0 He continued,
"our Indians judge that either Philip will go to them at Memenimissee, or
that they will c o m e with Philip at Ashquoach, which the Indians think
rather the more convenient place, a n d so they make 250 soldiers."51
Pynchon e n d e d his letter with a brief mention of Philip's strength,
according to his Indians: "Philip [has] but 30 guns, a n d the other 10 bows
and arrows, are now weak a n d weary a n d may be easily dealt with,
whereas if w e let him alone...they will burn our houses and kill us all by
stealth." 52 When Winthrop received this letter he sent a c o m p a n y of
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Mohegans, Pequots and English to raid Philip's location, a n d these
companies captured many important enemies. 53

THE ENEMY WITHIN

At the outset of the war, Massachusetts a n d Plymouth did not share
Connecticut's attitude toward Indians as combatants in the colonial
militias. As the war progressed, a n d Philip's campaigns saw success in the
western

settlements,

Connecticut's

the

strategy.

Narragansetts joined

two
When

eastern
the

colonies

Nipmucks,

disapproved
Agawams,

in Philip's fight, Massachusetts

and

of
and

Plymouth

colonists increased their distrust of all Indians.
At the outset of the war the Nipmucks of western Massachusetts
seemed content to let Philip a n d the colonies fight it out. 54 The English
relied on this neutrality to search through Nipmuck territories for Philip.55 But
W a m p a n o a g forces moved quickly through the western parts, a n d
paranoid colonists feared that Philip would intimidate the Nipmucks into
confederacy. Connecticut sent several representatives a n d ordered that
they turn in their weapons. 56 The Nipmucks hesitated (probably to defend
themselves in case of a W a m p a n o a g attack) and, instead, offered their
continued allegiance to the colony.
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Unsatisfied with the Indians' decision, Massachusetts Bay sent
Captain Hutchinson a n d a small militia c o m p a n y into Nipmuck territory to
demand

the

weapons.

Expecting

hostility,

the

Nipmuck

warriors

ambushed Hutchinson a n d his company. 5 7 They then attacked the local
town of Q u a b o a g a n d laid waste to it.58 According to one source, Philip's
forces arrived in Q u a b o a g that day a n d united with the Nipmucks. 59
The second event occurred a month later. Because of Philip's
success in "recruiting" the Nipmucks a n d several other Indian bands,
colonial authorities feared every Indian as potentially dangerous. In early
September 1675, Massachusetts d e m a n d e d the Agawams turn in all their
weapons to the colony. To prevent another Nipmuck-like occurrence, the
English a b d u c t e d the tribe's children a n d sold them into slavery. This act
of hostility angered the Agawams who, unlike the Nipmucks, had sided
with the colonists at the outset of the war. As a result, the Agawams joined
with Philip.60 In September a n d October, A g a w a m forces burned three
hundred homes in Springfield, Massachusetts. They were also responsible
for the massacre of Captain Thomas Lathrop a n d his sixty soldiers near
Deerfield Massachusetts on

18 September

1675.61 The attack

sent

Shockwaves a n d panic through adjacent regions.
When the Narragansetts cast their lot with Philip, the colonies feared
the

worst.

Keeping

these

Indians

out

of

the

war

was

crucial.

Contemporary historian William Hubbard wrote that if the Narragansetts
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actively e n g a g e d in warfare against the English earlier in the war "it would
have been very difficult, if possible for the English to have saved any of
their inland plantations from being utterly destroyed." 62 Every attempt was
made to keep them neutral.
Philip was aware that the Narragansetts would make powerful allies
and attempted to entice them into confederacy by sending them the
heads of English soldiers.63 The English viewed this as a violation of the July
1675 Treaty a n d quickly requested an explanation from the Narragansetts.
They saw this request as a violation of sovereignty. Hostilities rose until
attacks by Nipmuck a n d A g a w a m warriors at Springfield "resulted in the
United Colonies' invasion of Narragansett territory." 64 Canonicus, the
sachem of the Narragansetts, viewed this as open hostility against his
people a n d finally a c c e p t e d Philip's invitation of confederacy. 6 5
Attacks by Nipmuck, A g a w a m , a n d Narragansett forces on noncombatants further intensified panic. Between "August 1 a n d November
10, 1675, Indians did not leave a single one of Massachusetts' eight towns
on the Connecticut River unscathed." 6 6
The general population feared that Philip's success in recruiting
Indian groups would inevitably lead Christian Indians to cast their lot with
the sachem. The Nipmucks exemplified this expectation because they
were once part of John Eliot's proselytizing mission.67 In Massachusetts,
colonists began persecuting all Indians, whether or not they remained
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loyal to the colonies. At the helm of this movement was Captain Samuel
Moseley who "was censured by the government...for arresting without
warrant

a

group

of

praying

Indians

at

Marlborough, whom

the

townspeople had nearly lunched on the spot." 68
Moseley's hatred for all Indians earned him a reputation among
colonists, and many turned to him when they felt uneasy about strange
Indians in their towns. On 7 August 1676, while the war was coming to a
close, four men were incarcerated for the massacre of six Christian Indians
recently released from Deer Island (three women a n d three children). 69
Jenny Hale Pulsipher rightly contends that Massachusetts and Plymouth
had a difficult job keeping the population from murdering any Indians
residing in the colonies. 70 James Drake has emphasized that the colonial
authorities m a d e the best attempt to "determine an Indians' degree of
guilt before deciding his fate," but, on the other hand, the general
population were not so judicious in their decisions.71
Despite their disapproval of Indian persecutors, Massachusetts a n d
Plymouth authorities seem to have had their own suspicions that the war
was racially motivated. To prevent a united Indian alliance, Plymouth
banned the sale of weapons to any Indian within the colony. The Court
ordered, "none shall lend any Gun or Guns to the Indians on pain of
forfeiting them or the value of them to the colonies use." 72 Shortly
thereafter, a second law prevented the sale of guns to any Indian upon
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penalty of death. 7 3 Though these laws were aimed at hostile Indians, they
were not particular to them a n d left many non-hostile Indians unable to
defend themselves against persecution. 74
However, an influential minority of individuals in Massachusetts did
care about the welfare of Indians. Douglas E. Leach, in Flintlock &
Tomahawk,

labels this group "moderates" because they insisted on

moderate treatment rather than persecution. 75 Many of these colonists
had worked closely with Indians prior to the war's outbreak. They spent
years forging relationships based on mutual appreciation.
Daniel Gookin, John Eliot, a n d Thomas Danforth a d v o c a t e d for fair
treatment of Indians throughout the war. Because of their missionary work,
all

three

maintained

close

relationships

with

Indians

during

the

seventeenth century and c a m e to respect Indian culture. Eliot c a m e to
New England in 1631 as a Christian minister. In 1646, he established the first
Praying Town in Massachusetts where

Indians c a m e

and

learned

European styles of dress, language, reading a n d writing, a n d , most
importantly, religion. By the time King Philip's War erupted, the population
of Eliot's Praying Towns reached one-fourth of the Indians in southeastern
New England. 76 The towns were so popular that Daniel Gookin, one of the
Massachusetts Court Assistants (a very prestigious position), was offered
the first position as Superintendent of Indian Affairs. He a c c e p t e d the offer
and worked closely with Eliot to preserve the Praying Towns.
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Gookin b e c a m e

a captain in the Massachusetts

militia

and

frequently insisted that Christian Indians should a c c o m p a n y New England
soldiers on military expeditions because of their vast knowledge of the
terrain. 77 During the war Eliot m a d e every attempt to minimize persecution
of the Praying Indians and to save his towns. As the war progressed, antiIndian sentiment grew. Their attempts to legitimize Christian Indians as
non-threatening

failed. Even more, colonists targeted

Gookin

and

Danforth as traitors a n d conspirators who, for their crimes, deserved
death. On one occasion, townspeople passed small slips of paper
throughout the town that read.

Reader thou art desired not to suppresse this
paper, but to promote its designe, which is to
certify (those traytors to their King a n d Countrey)
Guggins [Gookin] and Danford [Danforth], that
some generous spirits have vowed their
destruction, as Christians w e warne them to
prepare for death, for though they will
deservedly dye; yet w e wish the health of their
soules.78

Gookin was a special target since he had power as a colonial council
member. More than the other two, he received death threats depicting
him as a sinner who deserved hell.79
The hostility toward Indians resulted in their displacement onto
reservations. On 13 October 1675, the colonial authorities attempted to
keep Christian Indians from the war altogether. They ordered, "all the
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Natick Indians be forthwith sent for, & disposed of to Dear Island, as the
place appointed for their present abode." 8 0 Several tens of guards a n d
soldiers were sent to local friendly Indian towns to supervise them. 81 Any
Indian found off of the designated reservations without a guard was to be
apprehended a n d turned over to the colonial authorities. For nearly two
months, Massachusetts and Plymouth rounded up any loyal Indian a n d
p l a c e d them on constant surveillance.
From June

1675 to February

1675/6 most colonial authorities

believed that all Indians were dangerous. The fear of a united Indian
alliance resulted in the persecution, a n d eventual internment of these
loyal residents. As war raged through New England, Philip's forces secured
significant victories. His successful recruitments a n d growing support
worried colonists who realized that colonial forces were smaller, weaker,
a n d slower than their enemy. Internally, colonists felt safer when Christian
Indians were removed to supervised reservations; externally, however, the
war had run much longer than expected and the colonies were running
low on provisions a n d soldiers.

THE COLONIES IN TROUBLE

During the first half of King Philip's War, colonial authorities did their
best to keep potentially hostile a n d friendly Indians from joining the war
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effort - no matter which side they chose. After Narragansett, A g a w a m ,
and Nipmuck forces cast their lot with Philip, colonial authorities passed
laws to prevent an internal rebellion amongst Christian Indians. Until
February 1675/6, the United Colonies believed that they could win the war
without assistance.
Philip's forces grew stronger by the day. While the Nipmucks
destroyed the western settlements, Narragansett forces moved toward
Plymouth from the south. In February, Nipmuck forces took Medfield,
Massachusetts, twenty miles outside Boston.82 Days later they were
spotted ten miles closer.83 The Narragansetts lit Providence, Rhode Island
aflame a n d quickly marched into Plymouth's territory of Rehoboth. 84
As Philip's forces grew stronger, colonial militia forces weakened.
Originally, colonists planned their supplies for a two-month skirmish.85 As
the war extended into November war rations and provisions ran low. 86 The
colonies hit near-famine levels twice by November. 87 The Massachusetts
Bay Colony Court wrote it was "considering the great danger of famine,
or at least scarcity of bread & other provisions, by reason of this war." 88
Again, weeks later the Court wrote that it was still in danger of famine a n d
prohibited the exportation of "fish & mackeral", a n d suspended the laws
that prohibited the "importation of wheat, bisket, & flower." 89
Conditions worsened by January when authorities could not even
get bread to their soldiers.90 Connecticut was able to supply their soldiers
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with "som pease...[a] little wheat or at least, little b r e a d " as "mills
generally [failed] this winter season." 91 Continued raids by Philip's forces
destroyed

settlements

that

would

have

helped

feed

Narragansett, A g a w a m , Nipmuck, a n d Wampanoag
quickly toward

Boston, Providence a n d

the

militia.

forces

moved

Plymouth. Colonial militias,

however, were becoming tired a n d hungry.
Supplying militia companies with weapons proved difficult. By
November, the General Court did not have sufficient weapons or
ammunition with which to provide its soldiers. The Court ordered "that the
committees of militia in the...towns shall hear, determine, & settle the
whole accounts...respecting

all disbursements of arms, ammunition,

horses, furniture, provisions, &c." 92 Shortly thereafter they instructed "every
town in this jurisdiction [to] provide, as an addition to their town stock of
ammunition, six hundred flints for one hundred of listed soldiers."93
According to these laws, towns were now ordered to supply their
companies with weapons a n d ammunition.
With food, provisions a n d aid running low, Massachusetts a n d
Connecticut discovered that large populations of impressed soldiers were
not showing

up for duty.

In December,

Massachusetts

lamented,

"because many of the soldiers now abroad, partly by wounds & partly
[through] the severety of the Season are so far [disabled], that no present
onset c a n be m a d e upon the Grand body of the Enemy." 94 Connecticut
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failed to raise 300 men for a campaign and General Winslow ordered his
forces to retreat from their stations because of the insufficient fighting
company. All across New England colonial authorities instructed soldiers to
retreat into garrisoned towns. 95

THE FEBRUARY DECLARATION

On 21 February 1675/6 the colonial authorities in Massachusetts
declared:

Whereas the present war with the Indians hath so
far exhausted the country treasury, that there is
not a sufficiency to prosecute the said war to
effect; for the encouragement
of
such
gentlemen merchants, or any other person or
persons, that are able & willing to disburse & send
to the public, it is hereby declared, that the
General Court of this colony shall from time to
time, a n d at all times, stand firmly obliged for the
repayment of all & every sum or sums disbursed &
lent for the use of the public. 96

Under these circumstances, soldiers no longer received payment for their
services. According to Bodge, "months a n d even years" passed without
soldiers

"receiving

all the wages

owed

to them." 9 7 The

February

Declaration was a statement that the colonies failed both economically
and militarily.
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This marked the turning point of the war. At the Council of War on
20 February 1675/6 Captain Benjamin Church told the colonial authorities
that if he were allowed "50 more [soldiers]...and 100 of the Friend
Indians...he [had] no doubt [that] he might d o g o o d Service." 98 The
Council responded, "That they were already in debt, a n d so big an Army
would bring such charge upon them, that they should never be able to
pay. And as for sending out Indians,

they thought

it no

wayes

advisable." 99 One day later the coffers were empty a n d the colonies
realized how close they were to failure. There was little food, provisions, or
soldiers; the colonies were in debt; a n d according to the Declaration
there was "not a sufficiency to prosecute the said war to effect." 100
The Council of War needed troops or Philip's forces would destroy
Boston, Plymouth, a n d

Hartford

like they

did

Providence. Out

of

desperation, the Council of War turned to Indians for help. Despite their
earlier determination to keep loyal Indians away from the conflict, they
had no choice but to let them in - it was their only c h a n c e for survival.
Thus, almost one week after Captain Church requested Indians for a
campaign against the Narragansetts, the Council of War sent Captain
Michael Peirse to march against Philip's army with "20 or 30 of the
southern Indians."101 Peirse's co-captain was a W a m p a n o a g
named "Captain Amos." 102
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Indian

On 25 March the company marched to Rehoboth in search of
enemy forces. In the pursuit the Narragansetts ambushed the c o m p a n y
one day later leading to the deaths of over fifty English a n d eleven
friendly Indians.103 Through this mission, colonial authorities realized that
bringing loyal Indians into the war could swell militia c o m p a n y numbers
a n d create a buffer zone between vital locations a n d enemy forces. The
shift in military philosophy was the major turning point of the war. There
was no c h a n c e of winning the war by themselves - as the February
Declaration proved; only with Indian reinforcements were Narragansett,
Nipmuck, A g a w a m , a n d W a m p a n o a g forces soon d e f e a t e d .
Days after the Peirse ambush, Plymouth authorities passed another
order for "the number of three hundred Indians, well fitted to go forth, a n d
be ready for a march by the eleventh of April next."' 04 Plymouth a n d
Massachusetts jointly ordered John Curtice to "take sixe Indians from
[Deer Island] for his assistance, with their armes, some of w c h Indians may
be improved for spies as the commander in cheife shall appoint." 105 When
Captain Church returned to the war in early June, Plymouth Colony was
"glad that Providence had brought him here at that junction" because
"they had concluded the very next day to send out an Army of 200 Men,
two thirds English, a n d one third Indians, in some measure agreeable to his
former proposal." 106 Others were instructed to take Indians in their
companies.
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By May, the court removed some Indians from Deer Island a n d
impressed them into military service.107 Many Indians were sent as scouts
to Medfield, Sudbury, Concord, Chelmsford, Andover, Haverill, a n d
Exeter.'08 Others were employed as guides into Indian territory. When Seth
Perry was ordered to go to the enemies a n d request a captive-swap, a
friendly Indian named Tom Dublett guided him. English soldiers were
allowed to go to Deer Island a n d "imploy [Indians] in scouting, labouring,
or otherwise...to our security." 109 Major Gookin a n d Captain Samuel
Hunting were allowed to take seventy Indians to fight in the service of the
colonies. 110 The Natick a n d Pawtucket Indians were taken from Long
Island a n d p l a c e d in the service of the English. Between forty to eighty
Indians were removed from their reservations every several days a n d
impressed to fight with the English.11'
This c a m p a i g n even forced colonial authorities to provide friendly
Indians with weapons to fight the war. The court determined that no
individual trade with Indians but also that "this law d o e no way prohibbit
the necessary supply a n d releife to such Indians a n d their families as are
by order imployed in the country's service, or as are otherwise under the
speciall care & inspection of authority, so that such supply & releife to
these Indians be m a d e as the Court or council shall allow." 112 The court
also ordered that the Treasurer now pay any Indian that served in the
militia. 1 ' 3
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English forces, now a c c o m p a n i e d by "friendly" Indians, moved
quickly against Philip's forces. There was the assumption that by 1 June
they would be on the doorstep of Philip's territory at Mount Hope. Similarly,
the Mohegans a n d Pequots fought bravely against the Narragansetts,
and on 2 July 1676, the Mohegans, Pequots a n d Connecticut forces
hailed a resounding victory over the Narragansett forces - one that left
them crippled for the duration of the war.
In the words of William Hubbard, the English "were necessitated...to
return Homewards to gratify the Mohegin and Pequod Indians."" 4 In a
letter from Puritan minister Thomas Walley to John Cotton Jr., Walley wrote
that "I a m glad of the success of Benjamin Church. That it is the g o o d fruit
of the coming of Indians to us, those that c o m e in are conquered a n d
help to conquer others. To observe throughout the land where Indians are
employed there hath been the greatest success if not the only success
which is a humbling providence of God that w e have so much need of
them a n d cannot do our work without them." 1 1 5 In another letter to the
Connecticut Court, the General Court in Massachusetts wrote,

but divine Providence ordering it that our forces,
by weaknes & wants, could not atteyne that
end, new forces were raysed, upwards of three
hundred men, horse & foote, with forty Indians,
committed to the conduct of Capt. Daniel
Hinchman & severall captaines under his
c o m m a n d , who since hath opportunely, by
sending out parties, discovered the enemy by
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our Indian scouts as fleeting up & down, a n d by
a party of horse, under the c o m m a n d of Capt.
Thomas Brattle, on the 5 th [May], between
Mendon
&
Hassansenemesit,
the
Indians
discovered the enemy...kild atwenty...none of
the troopers or scouts wounded. 1 1 6

Many scholars have missed the significance of the

February

Declaration. There are a few possible reasons for this. Douglas E. Leach
wrote the most comprehensive history of King Philip's War. Leach says that
his focus is on the military struggle in New England, a n d finds parallels
between World War II a n d the seventeenth-century war." 7 Though he tries
to see both sides, he nevertheless argues that the colonists had the time,
resources, and materials to wait out Philip's attacks. In his view the rebel
Indians were not prepared for such a long war, a n d by May they were
divided a n d starving. 118 For Leach, this was the clear division between
Indians a n d English: the English h a d the resources to finish the war, the
Indians did not. His conclusion rests on the idea that Indians fell into three
categories: enemy, neutral, or playing a small role in the English's success.
Thus, the February Declaration, which this essay argues illustrates the
United Colonies' failure to win the war alone, does not fit with Leach's
view of King Philip's War. He does not recognize how depleted English
supplies had b e c o m e in January and February 1675/6.
Nathaniel Philbrick, in his book Mayflower,

priviges

anecdotal

evidence over the legislative records, a n d hence does not mention the
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February Declaration. 119 Philbrick excessively admires Captain Benjamin
Church. When Church leaves the war in February because the colony
was "already woefully in debt" a n d had rejected his ideas, Philbrick takes
this at f a c e value a n d moves on with his narrative. 120 There is no discussion
about why Church was denied a fighting force of friendly Indians. He
focuses his attention on Captain Peirse who, in March 1676, was offered
twenty Indians from C a p e C o d .
James Drake makes no mention of the February Declaration. Drake
argues that King Philip's War was at first an internal conflict between
colonists who believed their opponents were children that

needed

discipline until the conflict b e c a m e unmanageable. 1 2 1 Drake skims past
the importance of the February Declaration - mentioning only something
similar. "After eight months," he writes "in February 1676, the English a n d
their Indian allies were at the depths of despair." 122 How d e e p was this
despair, he does not say. Additionally, Drake argues that "Indians played
a large role in putting down Philip's rebellion." 123 He does not, however,
explain why the Massachusetts a n d Plymouth colonies removed an
internment policy that, in February, led to the employment of Indians in
the colonial companies.
In f a c t many scholars d o not even address the issue of exhausted
treasuries in Massachusetts a n d Plymouth. Russell Bourne quotes Benjamin
Church's Entertaining Passages, but does not explore it further; Jenny Hale
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Pulsipher argues that in February 1676, soldiers were dissatisfied "with how
the war was being w a g e d " a n d explains it by discussing the military
ranking system; Daniel Mandell writes that by February 1676, "some towns
in Massachusetts reported that nearly 50 percent of those called to
service refused to appear. Others deserted after joining." 124 Mandell
makes no mention of the economic stresses, a n d argues that the reason
for this was the internal conflicts between soldiers a n d the government of
Massachusetts.125
All of these authors miss the importance of the February Declaration
as a symbol of failure. Economically, Stephen Webb writes, the New
England commonwealths did not recover from King Philip's War until a
century later.126 He writes, not "for a century would the per-capita wealth
of their colonists recover its pre-1676 level." 127 The colonies had no money
to pay troops or supply them with food a n d provisions. Fortifications in the
west were a b a n d o n e d because soldiers' supplies ran too low.
Of the authors who argue that the Mohawks played an important
role in the war's outcome, only Webb discusses their role in relation to
what

he

calls

the

period

of

"devastation,

demoralization,

[and]

dependence." 1 2 8 Webb argues that these factors a n d the Mohawk raids
were interrelated as early as February.129 The colonies feared that if,
during their time of "devestation" a n d "demoralization", they turned to
Governor-General Andros a n d asked his Mohawk allies to attack the
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W a m p a n o a g the English Crown would have a stake in New England ending the United Colonies' pseudo-independence. 1 3 0 Nevertheless, the
colonies had no choice a n d as Webb writes, "The Mohegan[s]...pressed
the Boston (and Connecticut) magistrates to a c c e p t this proposal by
Governor-General Andros, 'affirming that the said Mohauks were the only
Persons likely to put an end to the War, by hindering the Enemy from
Planting; a n d forcing them down upon us."131 With few other choices, the
colonies reluctantly a c c e p t e d their "dependence."

PHILIP'S EXECUTIONER

On 12 August 1676, Philip's forces retreated to Mount Hope. His
pursuers were Captain Benjamin Church, Major Savage, a n d a c o m p a n y
of English a n d Indians. At the advice of his Indians, Church's c o m p a n y
c o m b e d the swamp and found Philip reloading his gun. In shock, Philip
threw away his w e a p o n a n d ran into an ambush. He was shot in the chest
twice a n d fell f a c e down in the mud. The Indian who shot him, John
Alderman, quietly escorted Captain Church to the place from where the
shot was heard. Church a n d his company stood over the corpse in a w e
He then instructed an Indian to quarter Philip's body a n d hang the
remains from a tree. 132
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Church returned to his army group to relay the news: the war was
over; Philip was d e a d . Soldiers cheered a n d rejoiced at the news. Days of
fasting a n d thanksgiving commemorated the victory a n d acknowledged
the sacrifices m a d e for the safety of the colonies. 133 Thus, on 12 August
1676 John Alderman was hailed a hero. Alderman was an Indian who
ended the war that the colonies nearly lost.

CONCLUSION

This chapter offered a reexamination of the turning point of the war.
It argues that colonial military success between April a n d August 1676 was
the result the introduction

of

Indians into the war. The

February

Declaration of 1675/6 illustrates the United Colonies' total economic a n d
military failure. It also shows that as Philip's forces grew stronger between
January a n d February 1675/6, the colonists b e c a m e weaker. Facing
annihilation, the colonists enlisted the help of friendly Indians - a group
that they tried to keep out of the war for eight months. Daniel Gookin,
who probably relished the fact that he was right all along, argued that the
Indians a c t e d "as a living wall." 134 The argument presented here is one
that emphasized the colonial desperation during the war; or rather that
colonial forces h a d no other choice but to take a risk a n d admit Indians
into their militias. This led the colonists to victory in August 1676.
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CHAPTER III

THE "SKULKING WAY OF WAR"

The outbreak of King Philip's War in June 1675 forced a collision
between two different military styles. In New England, colonists d e p e n d e d
on a European-style phalanx configuration. 1 Central to the military
literature produced in Europe a n d America during the sixteenth a n d
seventeenth centuries was an insistence on a stationary army controlled
by a rigid formation. This literature also included advice on how to wield
large or heavy weapons such as pikes, harquebuses, matchlocks, or
flintlocks. Thus, heavy weapons a n d a relatively immobile army proved
effective in Europe where all armies, with few exceptions, used this military
structure.
In contrast, Indian warfare tactics relied on skulking, which was an
unpredictable, quick, and effective practice in New England's densely
w o o d e d forests.2 Before the arrival of Europeans, Indians fought with
bows, arrows, a n d tomahawks. These weapons were small, easily
portable, a n d allowed Indians the a d v a n t a g e of neither being seen nor
heard by their enemy. As trade expanded
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between

Indians

and

European colonists, the former acquired firearms. Yet, rather than adjust
their military style, Indians combined their speed a n d stealth with the
weapon's power.
A confrontation between these military cultures emerged in 1675.
This chapter will first consider the differences between Indian a n d English
military ideas, philosophies, a n d strategies. It will then argue that during
the first half of King Philip's War, the English refused to a d o p t skulking into
their military system for fear that they would lose their civilized identity. Yet
because European-style methods had little success against Indian skulking
tactics, colonial forces, during the first half of the war, spent time, effort,
and money fighting an enemy they could not see, hear, or fight.
Those that opposed the use of skulking tactics by colonial forces
soon awakened to New England in shambles, a n d their lives on the line.
As a result, the colonists discarded their familiar military methods for
skulking. When the colonies a d o p t e d skulking practices, W a m p a n o a g ,
Narragansett a n d Nipmuck forces could no longer use the woods a n d
swamps as escape routes. This chapter concludes by arguing that the
colonial victory against Philip's forces relied on the reluctant adoption of
Indian skulking practices in late February 1675/6 as a last effort to hold off
their defeat at the hands of Philip's forces.
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ENGLISH MILITARY STRUCTURE

Old

World

military

tactics

and

strategies

were

familiar

to

seventeenth-century New England colonists. Nearly every able-bodied
man was aware of the military literature produced in English during this
period. 3
The literature included a wide spectrum of fighting techniques. Texts
discussed the application of weapons, rank, etiquette, fortification, a n d
"the quality of horses suitable for heavy cavalry...to that a d e q u a t e for
dragoons." 4 In 1639, William Barriffe's Military Discipline or the Yong Artillery
Man offered step-by-step instructions on the proper way to hold a musket
a n d pike while marching to the "beats of the Drum" which he called "the
voice of the Commander,
coward."5

the spurre of the valiant, a n d the heart of the

John Cruso, in his Militarie

Instructions

for the

Cavallrie,

instructed officers on how to gather strategic intelligence a n d the
a c c e p t a b l e way to meet an enemy in the field. 6 Henry Hexham, in 1634,
wrote The Principles of the Art Militarie, in which he detailed European
military strategies with visual imagery - presumably for illiterate soldiers.7
According to Barbara Donagan, no "aspect of war escaped these
military authors of the earlier seventeenth century." 8
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Central to the literature was an emphasis on proper behavior,
formation, a n d w e a p o n control for an army or companies within an army.
Diagrams and texts instructed soldiers on the proper formation of musketmen a n d pike-men. According to Barriffe, "When w e instruct our Soldiers
how to face Square" it "be very necessary for young Souldiers to move 10.
or 12. paces upon every motion of facings."9 In formation, e a c h soldier in
rank was instructed to stand six feet apart, three feet apart, or one foot
apart, depending on the enemy's distance. 10 Men bearing muskets f a c e d
"right and left" while pike-men split into two groups a n d stood at the front
a n d rear of the formation facing the opposite direction. 11 These pike-men,
according to one source, should be "armed with a head-piece, a Curace
a n d Tases defensive, & with a Pike of fifteene foot long, a n d a Rapier
offensive." 12 In a sixteen-step diagram, musketeers were instructed on how
to discharge a musket beginning with its placement on a support stand,
then firing the w e a p o n , a n d finally resting it on one's shoulder.13 The
reliance on tactical formation, muskets, rapiers, and pikes, were the most
c o m m o n topics of English and European military literature. 14

THE COLONIAL MILITIA

Until

1675,

the

New

England

militias

mirrored

their

English

counterpart. Colonists were organized into small divisions of civilian soldiers
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known as trainbands. 15 In Massachusetts, every male colonist, age sixteen
or older, was required to participate in military exercises once every three
years, for six days at a time. 16 Drills consisted of a mixture of formation
maneuvers, weapons training, a n d proper military behavior. 17

Laws

instructed military officers to ensure that "their Souldiers be well a n d
compleatly Armed...with...two thirds of each Company be Musquetiers,
and those which serve with Pikes, have Corsets a n d head-peices." 18 Each
trainband was taught the basics of handling a sword, the correct posture
for holding a pike, firing a musket, a n d how to wear protective armor
properly. 19 Finally, a n d most importantly, the militia was instructed to
march in formation to the beat of a drum while calling the enemy into an
open "champion field." 20
Early New England settlers relied heavily on men with English military
backgrounds for protection. Settlers at Plymouth brought with them Miles
Standish, a professional soldier, for fear that in America the English would
be "in continual danger of the savage people." 2 1 Standish had been a
mercenary soldier in the Low Countries for Queen Elizabeth's army, a n d
was no doubt well trained in English military customs. 22 John Underhill a n d
John Mason arrived in America shortly after the first settlement. These two
were "schooled in England's wars on the Continent and in Ireland." 23
Military commanders derived their manner of fighting from the
European and English methods. 24 Standish, Underhill, a n d Mason brought
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Old World warfare notions to America. In Plymouth, Standish trained the
residents in the proper use of "Swords, Rapiers, and all other piercing
weapons" commonly used by the English a n d Europeans.25 During the
1637 Pequot War, Underhill a n d Mason marched to Fort Saybrook in
formation as one man "beat up the drum" a n d another flew the colonial
flag ahead. 2 6 Underhill acknowledged that the his company "chose to
beat up the Drum a n d bid them [Indians] into battell, marching into a
champion field." 27 He waited in the field while the army "displayed our
colours." He soon realized that none of the Indians "would c o m e neare
us."28 Annoyed at this blatant disregard for his military custom, Underhill
burned their Wigwams, destroyed their crops, a n d for several days stole
their food. 2 9 As the war proceeded, small ambushes by Pequot warriors
forced Underhill to "subdivide our divisions" into smaller units.30 These
regiments fought in "tight formations" while "militiamen marched about
'in rank a n d file'" a n d displayed their muskets a n d pikes.31
New England colonists a n d English citizens were aware of the social,
cultural, a n d economic effects of war. Reports from the continent helped
develop a sense of proper wartime etiquette. Between 1618 a n d 1648,
conflict in Hapsburg, Germany tore the country apart in what the English
believed the most barbaric ways. 32 Eyewitness reports contained detailed
accounts of soldiers beating "out the braines of poore old decrepid
women, as in sport" a n d "poore people...slaine before anothers face." 3 3
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The Thirty Years War, as it is now known, illustrated the "uncivilized"
devastation caused by unregulated wars. English people used the Thirty
Years War to reinforce formal etiquette for wartime. 34

INDIAN FIGHTING TACTICS

Indian warfare differed from the European custom in a number of
ways a n d they fought to accomplish a variety of outcomes. Customarily
Indians fought wars "to settle boundary disputes, avenge insults, a n d
extend or resist tribal authority." 35 Indians often warred against other
villages for three reasons: "valor,' 'revenge,' a n d to acquire captives." 36
Recently, Daniel Richter has shown that Indians initiated small-scale wars
through a practice called "mourning-war" where a bereaved community
raided another community to replace a member killed in war. 37 Unlike
Europeans, Indians rarely fought over economic a n d political issues.
Furthermore, warfare objectives were not Clausewitzian, meaning satisfied
by total extermination of one side or the other. 38 Warfare was not a
"continual struggle to complete victory"; nor was it intended to dominate
the enemy "normally associated with European-style conquest." 39
Until the arrival of European traders, Indians fought with lightweight
weapons, which allowed for quick a n d stealthy movements through
densely w o o d e d areas. William Wood, in 1634, noted that they "use no
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other w e a p o n in war than bows a n d arrows." 40 These weapons catered to
a strategy much

different

from the European style tactics. In his

observation, Wood argued that there were significant military differences
between Indians a n d Europeans. The "warriors make towards their
enemies in a disordered manner, without any soldier-like marching or
warlike postures, being deaf to any word of c o m m a n d , ignorant of falling
off or falling on, doubling ranks or files."41
As European traders established better relations with Indians, the
latter acquired muskets, powder, a n d shot. Indians found that although
muskets were heavier than bows, they were still as quick and "generally
excellent marksmen." 42 Contemporary authors noted how quickly a n d
quietly Indians moved through the woods. In 1674, John Josselyn observed
that they fought by "ambushments a n d surprises, coming upon one
another unawares." 43 The adoption of European muskets, and the quiet
skulking practices of Indians, frightened colonists who believed that
Indians might find a way to manufacture gunpowder a n d drive the English
from the continent. 44

OBSERVATIONS OF EACH OTHER

Colonists c a m e to America with preconceived notions of how wars
should be fought. 45 Since Indian warfare fit into the "uncivilized" category,
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colonists were reluctant to a d o p t skulking until, in King Philip's War, it
b e c a m e absolutely necessary. The success of the Pequot War in 1638
reinforced the colonists' admiration for their own military philosophy.
Colonial militias followed the European norms that governed how
wars should be fought, when they should be fought, "what weapons a n d
tactics are permissible, whom among the enemy it is appropriate to
kill...and what conventions [should be] observed." 46 Outside of these
conventions were cannibalism a n d torture, which were practiced by
Indians. Eyewitness accounts of these practices during wartime frightened
colonists.
Indian

habits

that

fit

European

notions

of

"savagery"

and

"barbarism" were described with derision.47 In 1636, Jean d e Brebeuf
wrote that the Hurons captured a n d tortured enemy combatants for "Five
or six days." 48 The Hurons spent this period "burning the prisoners over a
slow fire, a n d not satisfied with seeing their skins entirely roasted, they cut
open the legs, the thighs, the arms, a n d the most fleshy part of the body
a n d thrust into the wounds glowing brands or red-hot hatchets." 49 In New
England,

Increase

Mather

wrote

of

a

similar

incident.

Wampanoags destroyed the town of Sudbury on 20 April 1676

they took five or six of the English a n d carried
them away alive, but that night killed them in
such a manner as none but Salvages would have
done. For they stripped them naked, a n d caused
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After

the

them to run the Gauntlet, whipping them after a
cruel a n d bloudy manner, a n d then threw hot
ashes upon them, cut out the flesh of their legs,
and put fire into their wounds. 50

Mather concluded, "they are the perfect children of the Devill."51
Thomas Abler acknowledges that while "we d o not have as many
comments concerning Indians' views of the European method of waging
war" it "seems incontestable that many European conventions a n d
practices would seem as barbaric to Indians as Indian practices did to
Europeans." 52 One of these practices was total war. After John Underhill
a n d John Mason lit the Pequot c a m p of Saybrook Fort in Mystic,
Connecticut aflame during the Pequot War, friendly Narragansett fighters
screamed, "mach it, mach it, that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is
too furious, a n d slaies too many men." 5 3 The Saybrook Fort was decimated
within half an hour a n d contemporary estimates reported between four
a n d "six hundred Indian souls" were "brought...to hell" on that fateful
day." 5 4 Those that escaped the fire were butchered with English swords.55
Young men, who had never experienced warfare firsthand were shocked
by the carnage and noted carcasses "so thicke in some places, that you
could hardly passe along." 5 6
Colonial

soldiers

also

judged

Indian

strategy

as

strange,

unimpressive and uneffective. After Underhill obliterated the Pequot
forces he sent his Mohegan allies into Pequot territory so "that w e might
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see the nature of Indian war." 57 After observing for some time, Underhill
hyperbolically remarked that the Mohegans "might fight seven yeares
a n d not kill seven men." 5 8 To his surprise, the Indians " c a m e not neere one
another, but shot remote, a n d not point blanke, as w e e often d o e with
our bullets." 59 Fighting, he believed, "is more for pastime, than to conquer
a n d subdue enemies." 60 The English hardly considered this method of
c o m b a t warlike since "the [Indians] fight farre differs from the Christian
practice." 6 1 John Mason suggested that their fighting "did hardly deserve
the Name of Fighting." 62 Roger Williams, five years after the Pequot War
ended,

reiterated

Underfill's

observations.

Williams

wrote

of

the

Narragansetts, with w h o m he had familiar relations,

Their Warres are farre lesse bloudy, a n d
devouring then the cruell Warres of Europe; and
seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field : partly
because when they fight in a w o o d every Tree is
a Bucklar [shield]. When they fight in a plaine,
they fight with leaping a n d dancing, that
seldome an Arrow hits, a n d when a man is
w o u n d e d , unlesse he that shot followes upon the
w o u n d e d , they soone retire a n d save the
w o u n d e d :and yet having no Swords, nor Guns,
all that are slaine are commonly salin with great
Valour a n d Courage : for the Conquerour
ventures into the thickest, a n d brings away the
Head of his Enemy.63

Military leaders believed that skulking was futile against English tactical
superiority a n d failed to see "the sophistication a n d military effectiveness"
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of Indian practices. 64 The belief that their military strategy was superior
during much of the seventeenth century kept them from adopting a
skulking strategy.
Thomas Abler believes that the evidence points to the likelihood
that colonists used rape in war. 65 In 1672, The General Laws and Liberties
of the Massachusetts Colony c o n d e m n e d the practice of rape in war. 66
This might have been a case of prevention, rather than reaction, but it
does indicate that the problem was on the minds of colonists. Rape
warfare might have shocked Indians, since it did not fall into their
philosophy of a c c e p t a b l e conduct.
There are no reported cases of captivity-rape by Indians during the
seventeenth century. 67 When Nipmuck forces captured Mary Rowlandson
at Lancaster on 10 February 1675/6, Rowlandson spent nearly three
months with the Indians. She was eventually ransomed in May 1676 for £20
and wrote a narrative of her experiences. In The Sovereignty

and

Goodness of God, she emphasized, "not one of them ever offered me the
least abuse of unchastity to me, in word or action."68

James Axtell argues

that rape perhaps did not occur among Indian communities because
many female captives were a d o p t e d into the community to fill familial
roles.69 Quinnapin, the Nipmuck sachem, perhaps saw her as an individual
who could fulfill the duties of a w o m a n in the clan. 70
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A COLD WAR

Between the Pequot War a n d King Philip's War, colonial militias did
not c h a n g e their battlefield strategies. In the relative p e a c e of the midcentury decades, there was no incentive to drive transformation. After the
successes of the first war, colonists assumed that the European-style
system was more effective than Indian skulking. Kyle Zelner argues that
colonial authorities paid little attention to developing a new model army
for fear that it "would tarnish their image" as civilized Englishmen.71 The
cold war between the two cultures allowed colonial authorities to
m a n a g e Indian relations through diplomatic agreements rather than
military engagement. When these agreements failed at the outbreak of
King Philip's War, the colonies fell back on a military system that h a d rarely
been tested by the realities of New England as battleground.
Economic prosperity between 1640 and 1670 enabled colonists to
move farther into the backcountry. In five years, 1637 to 1642, Boston
authorities purchased roughly 129 grants for an average of four acres per
household. 72 By 1660, colonial towns grew at about one town per year expansion limited only by the competing claims of rival colonies. 73 Settlers
brought livestock with them for survival. According to Virginia DeJohn
Anderson, as early as 1634, towns g a u g e d their prosperity by the size of
their herds.74 Because towns d e p e n d e d so heavily on livestock, "New
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Englanders reversed the usual English fencing practices" which allowed
animals to roam into Indian territories a n d d a m a g e crops. 75
For protection against encroachments many Indian communities
submitted themselves to English c o m m o n law with the expectation that
they would be protected from wandering livestock.76 Because of the
success of settlements in the backcountry, seventeenth-century "settlers
no longer needed the friendship of Indians." 77 As a result, laws were
passed that did not recognize "the fundamental incompatibility of English
a n d Indian subsistence regimes," a n d "colonial authorities repeatedly
permitted joint use of land." 7 8 As James Drake argues, King Philip's War
began because of the colonial authorities' inability to fulfill their reciprocal
responsibility to protect Indian property. 79 Without a sound compromise
between 1636 a n d 1675 based on mutual respect a n d reciprocation both
sides b e c a m e frustrated.
Even as Philip m a d e preparations for war, the colonies continued
their push for the diplomatic relations that had divided the two cultures.
Philip was called to Massachusetts a n d Plymouth a total of thirteen times
between 1662 a n d 1671 to account for rumors of conspiracy. 80 In 1671,
Philip appeared before a council in Taunton where he signed an
agreement that forfeited his authority a n d surrendered his weapons to the
colonial authorities.81 The sachem was infuriated by this blatant disregard
for his authority. The colonial authorities, however, hoped that Philip's
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ambitious troublemaking would end with this agreement. 82 When it
appeared that Philip was preparing for war, Plymouth organized its forces
a n d Rhode Island offered its support. 83

THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF OPEN WAR

Because the colonial militia d e p e n d e d on Old World etiquette a n d
strategy during the first half of the war, Indians often

obliterated

settlements, livestock, and settlers with little or no resistance. 84 Frightened,
angry colonists often described Indian skulking tactics in insulting terms.
Nathaniel Saltonstall called Indians, "Wolves" who would "dare not c o m e
foth out of the Woods a n d Swamps" to fight properly. 85 Similarly, other
colonists who experienced the destruction of their homes, farms a n d
communities emphasized similarities between the pernicious skulking of
Indian warfare a n d the devil's work. 86 Through the winter months of 1675,
the colonial militia gradually modified its military strategy a n d system to
c o m b a t Indian skulking. In March 1675/6, the colonial militias were losing
the war. To save themselves they reluctantly a d o p t e d skulking tactics. This
tactical transformation contributed significantly to the colonial victory on
12 August 1676.
Seven or eight of Philip's men arrived in Swansea on 20 June 1675.
When an Englishman refused to sharpen their hatchets because "it was
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the Sabbath Day, a n d their G o d would be very angry if he should let them
d o it" the Indians b e c a m e angry. 87 To show their irritation, they broke into
another's house and stole some food. After they finished, they turned their
attention to a man walking down the road, whom they took captive for a
short time. 88 Swansea residents panicked a n d quickly sent a message to
Plymouth

and

Boston for

help. When

Governor

John

Leverett

of

Massachusetts received this letter he ordered that the drums be beaten
to signal war. In "three House time" Massachusetts "Mustered up about an
Hundred a n d ten Men." 8 9 The other settlements - Plymouth, Connecticut,
a n d Rhode Island - joined the charge a n d spent several days enlisting
volunteers for the militia.90
Trouble in Swansea escalated, a n d more W a m p a n o a g warriors
provoked the settlers.91 For several hours, W a m p a n o a g men harassed the
towns' residents until a young man shot an Indian d e a d . This was exactly
the excuse Philip needed to declare war against the colonies.
One day later, the Indians attacked Swansea, killed the young
man, his father, a n d "five more English."92 One account of this event
wrote that

They took [a woman]...skinned her Head, as also
the Son, a n d dismist them both, who immediately
died. They also, the next day killed six or seven
Men...and two more at one of the Garrisons; a n d
as two Men that went out of one of the Garrisons
to draw a Bucket of Water, were shot and
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carried away, a n d afterwards found with their
Fingers a n d Feet cut off, a n d the skin of their
Heads slayed off.93

Colonial forces arrived a n d "found divers English Murthered on the Road,
a n d were informed by the English there, of divers Hostilities of the
Indians."94 Swansea was destroyed, a n d eventually a b a n d o n e d . In only a
few days Philip h a d shown the crushing power of W a m p a n o a g forces.
The English forces were not prepared for c o m b a t in densely
w o o d e d areas. They neither knew, nor w a n t e d to know, how to maneuver
through the forests. Instead, one Massachusetts Captain, Samuel Mosely,
used "several Dogs" to find the Indians in the swamps. 95 When Plymouth
e n g a g e d their enemy on 29 June, Wampanoag warriors shot a n d
w o u n d e d a large portion of colonial forces a n d killed the commander.
When the English attempted retaliation the Indians "ran into Swamps" a n d
prevented "a further pursuit of the Enemy." 96 Increase Mather wrote that
when the Indians used the natural resources to their advantage "nothing
could be done against the Enemy." 97 Nathaniel Saltonstall e c h o e d
Mather's observation when he wrote that the Indians behaved

Like Wolves, a n d other Beasts of Prey, that
commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by
Stealth, [and] dare not c o m e forth out of the
Woods a n d Swamps, where they lay skulking in
small Companies, being so light of Foot that they
c a n run away when they [wish], a n d pass Bogs,
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rocky Mountains, where w e could by no Means
pursue them. 98

Even when colonial forces followed Indians into the woods they
were incompetent. Mather reported that they "sometimes unhappily
shoot English men instead of Indians."99 As a result. Lieutenant Phineas
Upham b e g g e d the Massachusetts authorities for soldiers "acquainted
with the woods" because his soldiers dared not to pursue their enemy. The
colonial militias were unprepared for warfare in the swamps, a n d officers
realized that they were unprepared for c o m b a t in the swamps a n d thus
risked "away Mens lives."100
On 18 July, Massachusetts Bay a n d Plymouth forces combined their
efforts to seek out the Indians in the swamps. Not knowing where their
enemy lay, colonial soldiers shot at "every Bush they see move (supposing
the Indians were there)." 101 Wasted ammunition b e c a m e a problem for
New England forces, as they aimlessly shot at anything that moved.
Powder was not c h e a p . Though the first gunpowder mill was constructed
in 1675 colonists still imported brimstone a n d saltpeter. 102
The successes of Indian ambushes showed how poor the English
were at detecting Philip's forces. When Captain Thomas Lathrop a n d
eighty of his men transported "cartloads of goods near Deerfield,
Massachusetts" an Indian company ran out of the swamp a n d killed
seventy men. 103 On 2 August, Nipmuck forces, now allied with the
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Wampanoags, surprise attacked

Captain

Hutchinson's company

in

Brookfield. Indian forces left the town smoldering after they " w r a p p e d
special arrows with rags containing brimstone a n d 'wild fire" a n d shot
them into houses.104 Reports of "travelers being waylaid" while walking
through towns forced many to relocate closer to Boston.105 Increase
Mather noted that Indians knew "where to find us, but w e know not where
to find them." 1 0 6
Philip moved quickly. The success of his forces rested on their ability
to avoid "block-houses a n d instead hit isolated farms. The English, secure
in their block houses, could d o little more than w a t c h as the Indians
devastated their farms." 107 In Taunton, colonists' best attempts to c a t c h
Philip's forces by erecting forts were foiled. Instead, Philip led his forces
across a water passage into a swamp a n d escaped capture. 108
When colonial forces p l a c e d another trap for Philip on 30 July, Philip
"slipped

past the

area's troops" a n d

attacked

into central

New

England. 109 From here, Philip's forces a n d Nipmuck forces combined to
destroy the towns of Brookfield, Taunton, Bridgewater, a n d Dartmouth.
Before any news of their whereabouts reached other

militia

companies, the Indians struck Northfield. When Major Robert Treat realized
that Philip's forces had moved further west, they pursued, "leaving cattle
there a n d even soldiers' corpses unburied". 110 Similarly, Major Pynchon
received

news

that

Philip's

forces
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intended

to

attack

Hadley,

Massachusetts in October 1675. Pynchon and a company of 190 soldiers
rushed to Hadley "only to find the town in flames, and the Indians fled." 111
John Easton wrote that soldiers spent weeks searching the coastlines for
Philip while they waited for information about Philip's next attack. 112
Virginia DeJohn Anderson has shown that when Indians raided
towns at the beginning of the war, they specifically targeted livestock.113
According to Anderson "livestock had c o m e to symbolize the relentless
a d v a n c e of English settlement." 114 Very rarely did Indians consume the
animals, but rather they tortured them by cutting legs, intestines, a n d
pulling out eyes.115 By focusing on the slaughter of animals, Anderson
argues, Indians were sending "a message of terror to their enemies." 116
Though Anderson's argument is sound, she does not consider the
strategic importance of killing English livestock in New England. Philip, by
1675, was well aware that colonists relied on livestock for sustenance. 117 In
an attempt to starve the colonists into submission, Philip, according to one
account, had killed "eight thousand head of Cattle" in the first seven
months. 118 Each town the Indians raided cost the inhabitants hundreds of
horses a n d

cattle -

essentially debilitating towns a n d forcing

the

inhabitants to leave. Providence lost "neer a hundred cattell", while areas
along the border of Rhode Island a n d Massachusetts lost "at the least a
thousand horses &...two thousand Cattell And many Sheep." 119
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As the war progressed, coastal towns had little food to give its
soldiers in the backcountry. In some circumstance, c o m p a n y units arrived
into towns to find it destroyed. Often stayed "thereabouts till they have
eaten a n d consumed what stock of Cattle or Sheep the Indians had
left "120 while the colonial army foraged for food, Philip's forces attacked
other towns a n d settlements. 121 The Indian forces strategically debilitated
entire militia companies by destroying their crops, livestock, a n d shelter
with unpredictable raids. Colonial fighters were too slow, too weak, a n d
too hungry to protect themselves from Philip's forces a n d settlements fell
like dominos. 122
When the first generation of soldiers who h a d fought in the Pequot
War died, they left the subsequent generations unprepared for military
combat. The first generation consisted of Underhill a n d Mason who died in
1672; Lion Gardiner in 1663; a n d Endecott in 1665.123 This new generation
consisted of Captain Samuel Mosely, a former privateer in Jamaica, Major
Thomas Savage, who, although never engaging in armed conflict was
Boston's militia captain from 1652 to 1682, and various landowners that
were elected officers by their town. 124 The infantry, furthermore, was m a d e
up of all volunteers who had no other experience with war than the
triennial military drills that taught them how to use Old World weapons. 125
Thus, this generation of New England soldiers had remarkably little
experience fighting as wartime combatants.
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BENJAMIN CHURCH AND THE WRONG TYPE OF WAR

Early in the war, one soldier in particular, realized the inefficiency of
Old World tactics. Church was raised in a military family after his father,
Richard Church, fought with the colonists in the Pequot War. Because of
his service in the colony, Richard's name shows up on the 1643 Plymouth
Colony list of men able to bear arms.126 Captain Church was, thus, well
trained in military weaponry of the seventeenth century. Yet what m a d e
Captain Church stand out a m o n g other colonial fighters was his ability to
adopt Indian skulking tactics early in the war.
In 1674, Captain Church moved from Duxbury to Sogkonate (now
known as Little Compton, Rhode Island). During the seventeenth century
Plymouth Colony purchased the area from the Indians. In all likelihood,
Church's wife Alice Southworth's grandmother a n d step-grandfather,
Alice Carpenter a n d Governor William Bradford, purchased the area a n d
it was passed down through the generations. But Church was the first
colonist to move to Sogkonate a n d soon gained " g o o d a c q u a n t a n c e
with the Natives...and was in a little time in great esteem among them." 1 2 7
In particular, Captain Church took a familial liking to the Indian sachem
Awashonks a n d her people, the Sogkonates. His kindness to Awashonks
a n d her people earned their trust.
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Church

never

explained

how

he

came

to

recognize

the

effectiveness of skulking - other than that it worked - but w e c a n d e d u c e
from his narrative Entertaining

Passages that his willingness to a d o p t

Indians into his company at an early stage played a significant role. One
historian believes that Church's

openness to human relationships with Indians
m a d e Church c a p a b l e of learning from them. It
was this quality that m a d e him successful in
partisan warfare. Unlike the regular soldiery,
Church learned from Indians how to fight Indians,
and since he also knew how to recognize a n d
evoke the humanity of the Indians, he was able
to bring personal influence to bear in diplomacy
and in recruiting Indians to fight against King
Philip.128

When war broke out in 1675, the Plymouth government recruited
Church. During the early stages of the war he met fierce resistance to his
adoption of Indian tactics. When he insisted that he could take a
company of his best men to surprise an Indian war party, the ranking
officer told Church his methods were flawed and the orders were to "go
to Mount-hope

a n d there to fight Philip" openly. 129 After the Great Swamp

Fight of December 1675, Church recommended that since the militia
companies had driven the Indians from the swamps English forces should
stay in the Narragansett wigwams for the night. He argued that since the
"Wigwams were Musket-proof" a n d "Sufficient to supply the whole Army"
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with "a g o o d warm House to lodge in," they would surely protect the
soldiers from "the Storms a n d Cold." Another ranking officer believed that
instead the wigwams should be burned. The c o m p a n y doctor sided with
the latter who, while operating on a bullet wound in Church's leg, told him
"if he gave such advice as" to stay in the wigwams for the night "he
should [let him] bleed to Death like a Dog." 130
There is no doubt that Church's ability to cross between worlds (to
sleep one night in a house, a n d one night in a wigwam) worried colonists.
Solomon Stoddard c o m m e n t e d that if those that used skulking tactics
"act like wolves" they are to be "dealt withall as wolves." 131
Thus, Church encountered heavy resistance when he met with the
Council of War in February 1676. Church recommended "he...take the
C o m m a n d of Men" a n d "not lye in any Town or Garrison with them,
but...lye in the Woods as the Enemy did." 1 3 2 This, as well as his argument
that "they must make a business of the War, as the Enemy d i d " was
rejected as "no wayes advisable." 133 William Hubbard, writing about King
Philip's War in 1677 wrote that the early failures of colonial troops occurred
because they took "up a wrong Notion about the best Way a n d manner
of fighting with the Indians...that

[they believed] it were best to deal with

the Indians in their own Way." 134
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TWO CHOICES

Holding onto Old World military tactics for fear that they would lose
their identity proved costly. English colonists realized early in the war that if
they admitted that Indian warfare was strategically a d v a n c e d - a n d
a d o p t e d it - they would b e c o m e victims of the wilderness.135 As a result,
the colonies suffered the heaviest d a m a g e between September 1675 a n d
February 1675/6. By February, the situation in New England was dire.
Deerfield, Northfield, Swansea, Hatfield, Hadley, Springfield, Rehoboth,
Providence, Wrentham, Marlborough, a n d many other towns were
attacked, pillaged or burned to the ground. 136 Additionally, thousands of
homes were decimated. 1 3 7
Philip's forces pressed forward until, by February 1676, they h a d
destroyed towns like Chelmsford, Medfield, Scituate, a n d Weymouth. The
town of Medfield was "just twenty miles from Boston." 138 Days later, "Indian
raids c a m e within ten miles of the town." 1 3 9 Providence, Rhode Island rose
up in flames a n d everything south of Pawtucket, Rhode Island was
a b a n d o n e d . Massachusetts' residents fled burning towns for protection
closer to Boston a n d Plymouth. 140
Officials in Boston planned for the worst. Their idea: build a
fortification around Boston "from the head of navigation on the Charles
River to a point on the Concord River in the town of Billerica."141 In upper
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Connecticut, inhabitants and soldiers crowded into the only homes left
standing, going days without food or protection. 142
Even with much of New England in flames, the colonies continued
to hold onto their Old World military style. Thus, colonial forces continued
to make costly mistakes a n d experienced devastating losses. During a
campaign in Connecticut, "one of the English soldiers wore squeaking
shoes" a n d an Indian guide refused to march forward until the soldier
replaced his shoes with a pair of moccasins. Another soldier "wore a pair
of leather breeches which being dry made a rustling noise, which the
Indian objected t o " a n d halted the procedure "until the breeches were
either removed or soaked in water, to prevent the rustling." 143 During an
expedition in 1675, militias were still holding up the emblematic "Colours in
the Front of [their] Company."' 4 4
The colonists needed to make a choice: continue fighting as their
ancestors had and lose the war (which meant losing everything), or learn
from the Indians a new method of fighting. With the former the colonists
would have lost their lives, the latter, their link to the past. For fifty years,
colonists spent time, energy, a n d money pulling the Indians out of the
wilderness; by 1676, the Indians successfully pulled the English into the
wilderness. The colonists' existential choice to live meant there was no
turning back to the past for help.
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TURNING POINT OF THE WAR: ADOPTION OF INDIAN TACTICS

Reluctantly, colonists made the choice to a d o p t Indian tactical
methods. Between October 1675 a n d December 1676 the colonies
began modifying their strategy. On 13 October 1675, colonial authorities
announced, "Whereas it is found by experience that troopers & pikemen
are of little use in the present war with the Indians" the militia "shall
forthwith furnish themselves with carbines a n d ammunition...to serve as
foot soldiers during the said war." 145 Pikemen were "practically worthless in
the forest because they lacked knowledgeable guides a n d perceptive
scouts" during the early stages of the war. 146 Slowly the colonial military
realized that the only way to win a war against the Indians was to learn
how to fight like them.
Scholars have underemphasized this last point. Douglas E. Leach
and Patrick Malone argue that that Philip's forces never stood a c h a n c e
against the colonial army. Leach argues that Philip's forces lost because
they were ill prepared for a long-term struggle. Throughout Flintlock &
Tomahawk,

Leach maintains that Indian attacks were merely "setbacks"

to colonial forces, a n d that English forces realized they could end the war
by attacking Indian crops by the winter of 1676.147 For Leach, spring
harvests enabled colonists to "carry on the war almost indefinitely while
the Indians continued to use up their very limited resources."148 In this view,
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the colonists' wore out the Indians out by protracting the war a n d burning
Philip's means of sustenance. 149
Malone, similarly, explains King Philip's War as a war d e c i d e d by
attrition a n d technological superiority.150 Malone argues that

Indian

tactics "were not enough to win a war against the far more numerous
colonists, whose

Indian allies, fortified garrison houses, a n d

almost

unlimited logistical support." 151 Colonists, accordingly, had better firearms,
protection, food-storage, a n d a larger population that Indians h a d no
c h a n c e of driving off the land. No matter how hard or long the Indians
fought against the colonists, the colonial militia always had the upper
hand. As a result, the longer the Indians fought, the more they suffered
"disease, starvation, lack of ammunition, a n d relentless pursuit" of their
enemies. 152 For both Malone a n d Leach, Philip's forces f a c e d inevitable
defeat from the moment they attacked Swansea.
James

Drake,

who

has

made

extraordinary

strides

in

our

understanding of King Philip's War, also argues that Philip's forces lost due
to internal divisions a n d a failed unification between all Indians. Though
the colonies were divided at first, their success materialized as colonies
unified through the dehumanization of Indians, unification of religion a n d
culture, and their resolve to fight. 153
Still others emphasize the role that Mohawk raids played on the
war's outcome of the war.154 Daniel R. Mandell claims that rather than
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fight a two-pronged war against the Mohawks a n d English, Philip's forces
surrendered to the English. When the English offered amnesty to all Indians
that had not e n g a g e d in heinous attacks against colonists, the Indians
serving under Philip submitted themselves to the English rather than f a c e
the torture most commonly

associated with Mohawks. ,55 Jill

Lepore

believes that the assault on Philip during diplomatic relations with the
Mohawks in 1676 decimated Philip's warriors - an assault from which
Philip's forces never recovered. 156
All of these theories, however, d o not take into account several
important factors. First, as mentioned earlier in this essay, Philip's forces
m a d e significant progress in New England from the outset of the war to
March 1676. Towns a n d settlements fell more quickly than they were
repaired, a n d were a b a n d o n e d . Garrisons a n d forts did not prevent
Philip's forces from maneuvering through the backcountry. Furthermore,
Nipmuck, Narragansett a n d W a m p a n o a g forces in the spring of 1676
were only ten miles from Boston proper. 157 If colonists had waited until April
for Philip's warriors to falter, they would not have survived the summer.
Furthermore, by calling the initial stages of the war a "setback" for
the

inevitable

colonial

victory,

Leach

and

Malone

ignore

the

contemporary situation in New England. Looking back, one can hardly
see the "inevitability" of victory during the first half of King Philip's War. Out
of ninety towns, "52 were attacked...25 pillaged a n d 17 destroyed." 158
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"Indian attacks produced a w a v e of refugees who swamped eastern
towns struggling to sustain the burdens of war." 159 As colonists relocated
closer to Boston, Massachusetts officials passed laws which m a d e it illegal
to leave settlements for fear that the buffer zone between major port
cities a n d Indian forces would be breached.' 6 0 That Massachusetts'
authorities entertained the idea of building a fortified wall around Boston
indicates how serious conditions were by 1676]6]
Secondly, if English technology was superior to their enemies, then
why did colonists suffer their heaviest losses during the first half of the war?
In July, when Massachusetts a n d Plymouth prepared for the war, they
supplied their soldiers with enough rations for a two-month skirmish.162 This
means that although colonial authorities believed that their military power
was superior - they expected to squash Philip in a short time - it was in
fact vulnerable to Indian skulking. English forces chose to change their
military tactics because they were, in fact, not effective against the
Indians.
Finally, there is no doubt that the Mohawk raid on Philip's forces in
February 1676 played a significant role in the outcome of the war.
Mandell argues that the death of many W a m p a n o a g warriors "no doubt
angered the Nipmuc a n d Narragansett war leaders," which caused a
division a m o n g leadership. 163 The Mohawks decimated Philip's forces. The
continued success of Mohawk fighters in western New England b e c a m e a
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critical turning point in the war as more of Indian warriors surrendered to
the English to escape Mohawk captivity. 164 When Captain Church led his
c o m p a n y of Indians a n d English into the backcountry, telling enemy
combatants

Come, Come, you look wild and surly, and
mutter, but that signifies nothing, these my best
Souldiers were a little while a go as w/7d a n d surly
as you are now; by that time you have been but
one day along with me, you'I love me too, and
be as brisk as any of them.]65

Any

Indian

themselves...he

that

submitted

directly

to

Church,

and

"behave

would do well by them, and they should be his men and

not Sold out of the Country."*66 Faced with the choice of Mohawk torture
or submission to colonial forces - especially Church - the Indians chose
the latter, en masse.
But the Mohawk raid alone did not stop Philip's forces, nor does this
theory explain why colonial forces successfully captured hundreds of
Indians in war. In early March 1676, Massachusetts authorities sent Captain
William Turner on the first approved skulking mission. Turner marched with
"a recently released [Indian] captive" a n d a small company of men both Indians and English. When his forces arrived at the native c a m p of
Peskeompskut at nightfall, Turner instructed his men to keep quiet a n d
wait until sunrise to strike. All night. Turner a n d his men w a t c h e d as Indians
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ate a late-night meal of fish a n d beef (from cattle killed earlier). Turner's
company remained so quiet that the Indians at Peskeompskut h a d no
idea they were being w a t c h e d , a n d Turner noted that they did not bother
to secure their location with a guard. Finally, upon daybreak, Turner open
fired on the Indians. Unaware that colonial forces h a d fallen on them, the
Indians screamed "Mohawks! Mohawks!" 167 This was both the first ambush
by the colonial forces on Indians, a n d the first resounding victory of the
New Year.
With this, the colonial army took its first military plunge into the
wilderness and searched for their enemies on their ground. The woods
were no longer a sanctuary for Philip's forces, thus colonists eliminated the
unpredictability of Indian attacks. One historian wrote that Turner's attack
intimidated

the

Indians

and

the

"tribes

became

divided

and

demoralized" a n d soon broke "into small wandering parties." 168 Other
offensive attacks under Major Talcott, Captain Henchman, a n d Captain
Mosely pursued enemy forces into the swamps a n d killed them in great
numbers, or taking a large amount of captives. 169
Several weeks after Turner's forces ambushed the Peskeompskut
c a m p James Avery a n d George Denison used similar tactics against
Narragansett forces. Indian scouts and spies alerted Avery a n d Denison to
the location of Narragansett forces. The two captains laid an ambush
similar to the ones Indians laid for colonists during the early stages of the
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war. When Canonchet, the Narragansett leader pursued the bait, the
colonial forces outflanked the Narragansetts a n d open fired. 170 According
to Mandell one of the most "critical turning point[s] was the capture a n d
death of the powerful war leader Canonchet."' 7 1 The capture a n d death
of Canonchet "was really the death-blow of the war, for he was the real
leader of all active operations at this time." 172 His capture, a n d the
surrender of the Narragansett forces days later, effectively eliminated
Philip's chances to push colonists off his land, a n d gave the militia the
much n e e d e d morale boost that propelled them into victory.
Captain Church returned to the war in June 1676 after a four-month
leave a n d proved that he was "a person extraordinarily qualified for, a n d
a d a p t e d to the affairs of war." 173 Now that the colony understood the
effectiveness of skulking in war and approved their soldiers to use it,
Church quickly employed Indian tactics. In February, when Church
requested several men to "lye in the Woods as the Enemy d i d " , the
colonial authorities denied his request. When he returned in June, the
Governor

Josiah Winslow of

Plymouth was

"particularly

glad

that

Providence had brought him there at that juncture" and gave him two
hundred men, English a n d Indian, with which to fight Philip.
In his expeditions he captured the Munponsets without

"one

escaping." 174 He captured the forces of Little Eyes by hiding in the forest;
forced 66 Indians to surrender at the Great Swamp Fight; led the

112

expedition that killed Philip; a n d his company of Indians a n d English
formerly e n d e d the war in the south with the surrender of Anawon. 1 7 5 For
his

tactical

accomplishments,

Increase

Mather

praised

him

for

"achievements...so magnanimous a n d extraordinary, that my reader will
suspect me to be transcribing the silly old romances, where the knights do
conquer so many

giants."U6

As for the rest of the army, Reverend John Eliot wrote the following
to Robert Boyle in October 1677:

In our first war with the Indians, God pleased to
shew us the vanity of our military skill, in
managing our arms, after the European mode.
Now w e are glad to learn the skulking way of
war.177

CONCLUSION

Old World warfare failed in New England where there were no
battlefield greens or champion fields. Pikes, phalanxes, a n d swords, which
were c o m m o n features of European combat, were useless against
Indians. The military strategies a n d brilliant displays, such as pitched
warfare a n d the use of drums to signify the arrival of troops, b e c a m e more
of a burden in the backcountry. Pike-men were too slow for military
expeditions in America. Furthermore, formation lines brought colonial
forces many unnecessary losses.
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During the first eight months of the war, colonists were not able to
keep up with Philip's forces a n d suffered greatly for it. Ambush after
ambush, colonial forces d o u b t e d whether their divine right to subdue a n d
conquer the wilderness was in God's plan. Between the outbreak of the
war in June 1675 a n d the death of Philip in August 1676, towns a n d
colonies called nineteen separate Thanksgivings a n d Fasts to beg for
God's forgiveness. At no other time in New England were so many
Thanksgivings a n d Fasts called within a one-year period. 178 As soldiers'
morale dropped, so did their confidence that colonial forces would win
the war.
When colonists a d o p t e d Indian skulking tactics, replaced pike-men
with foot soldiers, a n d replaced their rapiers with tomahawks, the tide
changed. 1 7 9 Colonial forces responded more quickly to Philip's attacks
and drove Indians away from vulnerable settlements. Hostile Indians could
no longer hide in the swamps, or seek protection in the woods because
colonists were now willing to follow them into those areas. Slowly, soldiers
b e c a m e quieter a n d faster until their tactics were just as unpredictable as
Philip's. The raid at Peskeompskut by Captain William Turner a n d his
company symbolized how effective the English were with Indian skulking
tactics. Because they were no longer afraid of the swamps, Avery a n d
Denison's company captured Canonchet. These events were impossible
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for the early militia that relied on drums, pikes, flags, a n d

heavy

equipment.
The colonists did not win the war alone, h o w e v e r - Indians, who had
remained loyal to the colony, taught the colonists how to skulk in war. With
e a c h attack, colonial companies brought with them several Indians who,
during combat, kept soldiers quiet and hidden. The use of these Indians by
the colonial forces was another reason the New England colonies were
victorious in August 1676.
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CONCLUSION

On 21 February 1675/6 the colonies realized that their attempts to
defeat Philip a n d his allies had failed. Since the beginning of the war,
Philip's strength had increased, his allies grew, a n d his goals neared.
Colonists, on the other hand, were out of money, f a c e d

military

conscription issues a n d were days away from defeat. Only when the
colonies grasped the severity of this situation did they realize that their
military identity needed to change. One week after the coffers were
announced empty in the February Declaration, the Council of War
ordered Captain Peirse to use friendly Indians in his next expedition. This
decision, symbolized the turning point in the war. The adoption of Indians
and Indian skulking tactics into the colonial militias led colonies to victory.
Philip's forces and their allies won the majority of battles during the
early stages of the war because the colonies were not prepared for
skulking warfare. His victories in critical locations, challenged Old World
c o m b a t methods. In the Old World there were no battlefield greens. Pikes,
phalanxes, a n d swords, which were c o m m o n weapons of the Old World,
were useless against their new enemies. Heavy armor a n d loud noises
intimidated Europeans, but hostile Indians saw slow a n d noisy soldiers as
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easy targets. During the first half of the war, Philip a p p e a r e d to be winning
the war.
The February Declaration marked the moment when colonists
realized that they could no longer carry out the war without help. By
sending friendly Indians to internment camps, the colonial authorities
believed they were protecting both the Indians a n d the English from each
other. They were protecting both peoples physically a n d symbolically. The
English believed that Indians had nothing to contribute to a superior civil
a n d military system. When this system collapsed in February, the colonists
realized that to save their lives they needed help from friendly Indians.
After February, Indians proved to be vital allies in King Philip's War.
The military tactics that the Indians taught the colonists during the second
half of the war saved the colonies from destruction. Additionally, Indians
provided extra military support at a time when many colonists refused
duty. These

Indians

provided

a

fortification

Narragansett, Nipmuck, a n d A g a w a m

against

Wampanoag,

advances. Finally, successful

expeditions resulted from the adoption of Indians a n d Indian tactics,
which was a more efficient military strategy.
Indians also supplied colonists with detailed

information

and

intelligence on enemy forces. When heeded, this information helped the
colonies avert disaster. As this thesis illustrates, when colonial authorities
did not use spies a n d informants the result was disastrous for the colonies.
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The February Declaration c h a n g e d the way that the colonists
fought King Philip's War. They realized that they could no longer support
the war alone. Friendly Indians, a d o p t e d into the colonial militias, taught
the colonists the best way to stop Philip's forces. These Indians swelled the
colonial militias at a time when soldier moral was low. Finally, they
provided the colonial authorities with information that, when a c t e d upon,
saved hundreds of lives. There is a clear distinction between the first eight
months a n d the latter six months of King Philip's War. From March to
August 1676, the colonies saw great successes in their military expeditions.
These successes were due to the friendly Indians who fought for survival
alongside the colonists.
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